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ARGUMENT 
L THE CSRB WAS IN ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
FOR AN EXTENSION AND DENYING GRIEVANT'S DEFAULT MOTION. 
A. When reviewing an agency's application of its own rules the agency is 
not granted total deference* 
When an agency's application of its own rules is reviewed, it is reviewed for 
"reasonableness and rationality." Lunnen v. Utah Dept. ofTransp., 886 P.2d 70, 72 (Utah 
App. 1994). Thus, while the Agency is entitled to some, it is not granted total, deference. 
Id. The Agency argues that a complete disregard for the plain language of the Rules in 
favor of its own position is both "reasonable and rational." However, such an application 
eviscerates the Rules and leaves them entirely devoid of any power to provide due process 
for Grievant. Additionally Agency's position results in defacto immunity for the Agency 
for whatever negligence, carelessness, or inattention it demonstrates when processing 
grievances. 
Fortunately, instead of granting total deference to the Agency, the Rules provide 
limits to protect the Grievant's rights in the face of agency negligence, carelessness or 
inattention. The standard employed by the Rules is "excusable neglect." See Utah Admin. 
Code R137-l-13(3). Notwithstanding, in the instant case, the CSRB failed to employ this 
standard of review and the Grievant's rights were violated. 
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B. The CSRB is must find "excusable neglect" before an extension of time 
to file a brief can be granted, once the deadline to file has been missed. 
The CSRB erred in denying Grievant's first request for default; filed on November 
10,2003. While the Agency argues that it is entitled to deference in the interpretation of 
its own rules, it refuses to acknowledge that this deference is controlled by statutory 
limits. Specifically, the Agency is constrained by the Utah Administrative Code which 
requires, in cases such as this, that the CSRB apply an "excusable neglect" standard when 
choosing whether to grant a motion for an extension of time within which to file a late 
brief. See Utah Admin. Code R137-l-13(3). 
In the immediate case the Agency ordered the transcript for the Step 5 hearing, but 
then failed to timely file its Step 6 brief in compliance with Utah Admin. Code R137-1-
22(2)(a). The Code states, in pertinent part: 
[T]he Grievant in an appellate/step 6 proceeding must obtain the transcript of 
the evidentiary/step 5 hearing. After receipt of the transcript, the Grievant has 
30 calendar days to file an original and six copies of a brief with the 
administrator. Additionally, the respondent must be provided with a copy of 
the Grievant's brief. (Emphasis added). 
The Agency failed to file its brief in a timely fashion. Grievant then filed a default 
certificate. The default motion was filed in accordance with Utah Admin. Code R137-1-
22(3)(a) which states: 
[U]pon a motion by either party or upon its own motion, the board may dismiss 
any appeal prior to holding a formal appeal hearing if the appeal is clearly 
moot, without merit, improperly filed, untimely filed, or outside the scope of 
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the board's authority. (Emphasis added). 
In deciding the Grievant's default motion, the CSRB was constrained by Utah 
Admin. Code Rl 37-1-13(3) which states "[T]he standard of excusable neglect maybe 
offered as a defense to lack of timeliness in processing a grievance or for not appearing at 
a scheduled proceeding." (emphasis added). 
In its November 19, 2003 Order, however, the CSRB refused to enter a default 
against the Agency as requested by Grievant. Instead, on the Agency's motion, the CSRB 
granted a 30 day extension. This decision was rendered despite the fact that the CSRB 
failed to find that the Agency had reached the standard of excusable neglect. Grievant then 
argued this position and standard to the CSRB in a motion to reconsider. This motion was 
denied. Grievant was, and continues to be, baffled by this denial given the fact that the 
Agency never even argued that its failure to timely file its brief was due to excusable 
neglect as required by Utah Admin. Code R137-1, et. seq. 
Grievant is not surprised however that such an argument was not made given the 
facts surrounding the Agency's failure to timely file. Specifically, Grievant is concerned 
with the Agency's conduct surrounding the missed deadline and the failure on the part of 
the Agency to properly and promptly disclose information relevant, and potentially 
controlling, on the issue of whether an extension should issue.1 Of particular concern is 
1 Grievant notes that Agency's counsel's actions could constitute a violation of Rule 33 "Candor Towards the 
Tribunal" of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration. The rule 
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the Agency's failure to issue a carbon copy or courtesy copy of the letter that the Agency 
issued confirming the ordering of the transcript to Grievant. Because this letter was never 
submitted to Grievant and its existence was not discovered until the night before the Step 
6 hearing, Grievant had no prior opportunity to present. Regardless, this letter stands as 
independent proof, as well as an admission, of the fact that the Agency was on notice of 
the schedule by which their Step 6 brief was due. Further, the fact that this letter 
represents a communication with the CSRB and no copy was forwarded to Grievant's 
counsel is concerning. Respectfully, Grievant believes that, given this conduct, no 
excusable neglect could have existed and therefore the default should have been issued. 
Further, given the relevance and controlling nature of these discoveries, the CSRB erred 
in concluding that the information was not timely filed. 
C. The Agency had notice of the briefing schedule. 
It should be noted that the Code specifically defines "excusable neglect" as: 
the exercise of due diligence by a reasonably prudent person and constitutes a 
failure to take proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the 
person's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard in the processing 
of a grievance, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable 
hindrance or accident. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-2. 
states, in pertinent part, "A lawyer shall not knowingly... [fjail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel." In this case, Agency's counsel knew, or should have known, that her request and receipt of the 
Step 5 transcript started the 30 day time frame in which to submit Agency's brief Her failure to disclose to the 
CSRB the rule and the fact that she had requested and received the transcript constitutes a violation of Rule 3.3 and 
should be addressed accordingly. 
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The Agency's Response Brief is curiously devoid of any mention of the 
circumstances surrounding its failure to file a timely brief with the CSRB. The attempt is 
made to blame the CSRB for the Agency's untimely filing by claiming that the CSRB 
failed to provide a briefing schedule to the Agency. Apparently to great effect, because 
based on this reason, the CSRB granted the extension. See Brief of Respondent, 7. 
However, this position is difficult for the Agency to uphold, given that the Agency 
concedes to have ordered the transcript from the Step 5 hearing on September 8, 2003 (R. 
116) and received it on October 8, 2003 (R. 253). See Brief of Respondent, 3 and 
Addendum 2. This admission constitutes constructive notice, and a violation, of Utah 
Admin. Code R137-l-22(2)(a). Surprisingly, despite both this admission, and the 
Grievanf s strenuous argument in furtherance of this fact in her Brief before this Court, 
the Agency offers no explanation as to why it did not comply with the rule. Instead, the 
Agency simply provides that "the CSRB is entitled to deference in how it interprets its 
own rules." See Brief of Respondent, 8. The Agency's plea is woefully inadequate. 
D. Failure to employ the excusable neglect standard of review is abuse of 
discretion. 
The Agency attempts to sidestep Grievanf s argument, and the Agency's 
admission, that the Agency's brief was not timely filed and the standard of excusable 
neglect was not met. The Agency, through its own negligence, carelessness, or 
Page 5 of 19 
inattention, failed to file a timely brief. The standard of excusable neglect exists to protect 
the Grievant from such negligence, carelessness and inattention. The CSRB did not even 
mention this standard, did not make a finding that the standard had been met, did not give 
any reasons that would support a finding of excusable neglect, and, in short, failed to 
employ the appropriate legal standard in this case. This disregard for controlling law is an 
abuse of discretion. 
The CSRB erred in granting the 30 day extension to the Agency and denying the 
Grievant's default motion. As stated, the CSRB must employ the "excusable neglect" 
standard of review when granting such an extension. Courts have found that failure to 
employ this standard of review is, in and of itself, an abuse of discretion. Rios v. United 
States Dept. of Justice, 53 Fed. Appx. 40, 2002 WL 31781144 (10th Cir. (N.M.)). Further, 
the Agency's failure to address the issue of the applicable standard of review in its Brief 
should in no way lead the Court to believe it is a non-issue. 
E. The CSRB's decision is arbitrary and capricious. 
The Agency argues that the CSRB's interpretation of its own rale is not arbitrary 
and capricious. See Brief of Respondent, 10. Analogizing to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the Agency concludes that, since the CSRB may dismiss the untimely brief, as 
opposed to being compelled to dismiss the untimely brief, the CSRB may therefore make 
any decision it wishes without the risk of that decision being arbitrary and capricious. See 
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Respondent's Brief, 10. This circular argument, boiled down, essentially states, 'our 
decision is not arbitrary and capricious because it is our decision'. This argument takes 
no notice of the rules which are in place to protect the due process rights of the Grievant. 
Additionally, this argument fails to recognize that the CSRB has discretion in dismissing 
an untimely brief only if the prerequisite standard of review, excusable neglect, has been 
met. If the criteria for extension have not been met then no logical reading of the Rules 
permits an extension to issue. 
Further evidence of the arbitrary and capricious nature of the CSRB's actions in 
this case can be seen by the manner in which the CSRB has enforced applied the 
"excusable neglect" standard of review to achieve the same result Grievant now seeks. 
In Horn v. Utah Dept of Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1998), this Court 
found that the excusable neglect standard was central to the Grievant's claim. Because 
the Grievant had failed to file a timely brief, and likewise failed to meet the standard of 
excusable neglect for his failure, this Court found that he had failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, leaving this Court without jurisdiction. Id at 99, 103. 
By statute, both the Agency and the Grievant are held to the same standard. See 
CSRB R137-l-13(3) and Utah Code Ann. 67-19-40 l(4)(a).2 If either one of the parties 
2 Utah Code Ann. 67-19a-401(4)(a) states, in pertinent part, "Unless the employee meets the requirements for 
excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next step within the time 
limits established in this part, he has waived his right to process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the 
grievance." 
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fails to submit a timely brief, they must show the Court that they meet the standard of 
excusable neglect. In the instant case, the Agency did not even attempt to argue that 
standard, let alone meet it. Nevertheless, the State of Utah ys Career Service Review 
Board granted the State of Utah a thirty (30) day extension. 
As Horn illustrates, if a Grievant fails to file a timely brief, and then fails to meet 
the standard of excusable neglect, then the reviewing body has no jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal. The Agency apparently does not think that this rule applies to them. This double 
standard is the epitome of arbitrariness and capriciousness. This Court must apply the 
rules fairly and equitably to all parties. In doing so, this Court must find that the Agency 
did not meet the standard of excusable neglect when it failed to file its Step 6 brief in a 
timely fashion. 
F. The Agency's argument that the CSRB may deny a default fails to 
show that the CSRB must first meet the applicable qualifying standard 
to even apply for extension. 
The CSRB abused its discretion when denying Grievant's default motion. The 
Agency goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the CSRB has discretionary authority as 
to whether to grant a default motion. While the Agency tends to overstate the CSRB's 
discretionary powers, Grievant does not argue that the CSRB enjoys limited discretion in 
granting or denying the motions before it. Grievant does however, qualify this admission 
by asserting that the criteria for an extension (in this case, "excusable neglect") must be 
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established before discretion to grant the extension exists. 
Grievant further contends that the CSRB should not have denied Grievant's default 
motion in the instant case because the Agency did not meet the excusable neglect standard 
of review, did not act with appropriate candor to the governing tribunal or opposing 
counsel, misrepresented material facts, failed to follow proper communication etiquette, 
and failed to provide material documentation as required by the rules of ethics and 
procedure. 
In support of its contention that the CSRB has discretionary powers to deny a 
default motion for untimely filed briefs, the Agency cites two cases. See Brief of 
Respondent, 11. It cites the jurisprudential history of the Utah Supreme Court, where 
there have only been two cases, both in 1969, where the Court denied a default motion for 
failure to file a brief. However, both of those cases are distinguishable from the instant 
case.3 
In Harrison v. Harrison, 462 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah 1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
rejected the notion that it could not reach the merits of the case simply because one party 
was either unwilling or unable to file a brief. In the instant case, the Grievant does not 
argue that the Agency's failure to file a brief was because it was either unwilling or 
3 Plaintiff notes that Agency requests that oral argument not occur and that no published opinion issue. Grievant 
finds this surprising given the lack of case law, as evidenced by only two 1969 cases, on this particular topic. Further, 
Grievant reaffirms its position that oral argument should occur on this matter and that the opinion should be 
published so as to direct the CSRB and future Grievants on the applicability of the "Call-off Policy" as well as the 
need for establishing the excusable neglect standard once a motion for extension is made after a deadline is missed. 
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unable, but rather because it was negligent, careless and inattentive without excuse. Such 
behavior should not be rewarded by the courts. 
In the case of Fitzgerald v. Salt Lake County, 449 P.2d 653 (Utah 1969), the Court 
expressed frustration with the respondents for its failure to file a brief. Noting that the 
appeals process is governed by procedural requirements the court remarked: 
[I]t is obvious that if the appeal process is going to operate within the time 
generally contemplated a litigant should not be permitted to conceal his 
position until the time of oral argument without showing any justification for 
failing to comply with the procedural requirements" (Emphasis added). 
Id. at 654. 
The court then sanctioned the offending party for its failure to abide the procedural 
requirements of the Court and for failing to justify its violation. In the instant case, not 
only was there no sanction, the offending party was granted an extension even without 
showing excusable neglect. Again, the CSRB should not have granted the extension given 
the facts of this case. 
G. The reasons provided by the Agency to the CSRB for the Agency's 
failure to file a timely brief were misleading. 
The Agency claims that the CSRB's grant of the extension was not "unreasonable" 
due to the "acknowledged errors that led to the problem." See Brief of Respondent, 12. 
The only information provided to the CSRB by the Agency as a reason for the Agency's 
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failure to file a timely brief was that there was & possible* error on the part of the CSRB 
when providing a briefing schedule to the Agency.5 What is difficult to understand 
however is why the Agency did not disclose to the CSRB at the time that the Agency had 
ordered a Step 5 transcript on September 8, 2003, or that the Agency had received the 
Step 5 transcript on October 8, 2003. Further, the Agency failed to reveal to the CSRB at 
the time that, by statute, the party appealing the decision has thirty (30) days from the date 
of receipt of the transcript to file their brief. The receipt of the transcript placed the 
Agency on notice that it had to file a brief within 30 days, according to Utah Admin. Code 
R137-l-22(2)(a). The Step 6 CSRB panel, and more importantly the Grievant were 
unaware of this information. Fortunately, the Agency's actions were discovered the day 
prior to Step 6 appeal. Inexplicably however, the CSRB refused to consider this 
controlling and timely presented information. 
As a result, the CSRB's final decision was based on incomplete information. That 
lack of information need not have occurred if the CSRB had only considered Grievant's 
Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal. Its refusal to consider Grievant's 
motion, which contained Agency documentation proving the Agency's request and 
4 It should be noted that the CSRB official in charge of disbursing scheduling notices, Claudia Jones, generated a 
delivery certificate affirming that this notice was properly delivered. (Addenda # 3) 
5 Additionally, Grievant's counsel has repeatedly stated that the Agency participated in a scheduling conference 
prior to the establishment of the Step 6 briefing schedule, a schedule supported by the time lines outlined in the 
schedule itself and in the ordering of the transcript by the Agency. Additionally Mr. Thompson, whose office 
conducted the teleconference and whose secretary sent out the scheduling notices recalls having a meeting but is 
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receipt of the transcript, constituted a clear abuse of discretion.6 The CSRB's decision to 
grant the extension was therefore not reasonable nor rational because it was not based on 
complete facts, and resulted in an arbitrary and capricious application of the governing 
appellate procedure. 
II. THE CSRB ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS FACTUAL 
SUPPORT FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION TO TERMINATE 
THE PETITIONER. 
A. The Grievant has "marshaled the evidence." 
Grievant has, in fact, marshaled the evidence necessary to show that there was not 
a factual basis for the CSRB's determination. The Agency has asserted that the Grievant 
must "marshal the evidence" if the Grievant wants to challenge the factual findings of the 
CSRB. See Brief of Respondent, 13. While, Grievants contend their position is primarily a 
legal argument, the Grievant asserts that she has, in fact, provided sufficient facts to show 
that there was not a factual basis for the CSRB's determination.7 
L Grievant has shown that she notified her supervisors of her inability to 
work the requested shift. 
Grievant has shown, and the Agency does not dispute, that Grievant met with her 
unable to recall the specifics of that meeting. Regardless, notice of the original scheduling order is clearly 
established in this matter by the simple timing associated with the transcript. 
6 This documentation was obtained from the transcript service from which the transcript was ordered. The Agency 
itself did not, at anytime, disclose this information to Grievant. 
7 Agency's position is meritless as it pertains to this argument unless the Agency can establish some facts that the 
Grievant has failed to marshal the evidence. A simple assertion is irrelevant. 
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supervisors, Francesco Lepore, Diane Maciel and Chris Metcalf on February 19, 2003, at 
least 3 days before the scheduled shift. [Step 5 R.76:10-23; 299:2-7]. Grievant has shown 
that, during that meeting, she repeatedly informed her supervisors that she could not work 
the graveyard shift due to the fact that Grievant had to care for her disabled daughter. 
[Step 5 R.310:11 through 311:6]. Grievant has shown that she was instructed by Chris 
Metcalf that, if she intended to resign, she would have to submit a letter of resignation 
and turn in her keys. [Step 5 R.155:14 though 156:9; 181:2]. Grievant has shown that she 
never intended to resign because she did not submit a letter of resignation, nor did she 
turn in her keys. See Brief of Grievant, 5. 
2. Grievant has shown that the notification to her was a proper form of 
notification. 
Grievant has shown that her notification to her supervisors was proper notification. 
She has shown that, at the Step 5 hearing, the Agency's witness, Robin-Arnold Williams 
(director of the Department of Human Services (DHRM) was qualified as an expert on 
DHRM policies. [Step 5 R. 55:4-25]. Grievant has shown that, according to the expert, 
an employee's verbal notice to a supervisor that an employee would not be present for a 
shift could, on an individual basis, be considered "proper notification/' [Step 5 R.56:7-
24]. 
3. Grievant has shown that she did not (<abandony> her position. 
a. Grievant has shown that her actions did not constitute 
"abandonment" according to DHRM R477-12-2. 
DHRM R477-12-2 states, "An employee who is absent from work for three 
consecutive working days and is capable of providing proper notification to the 
8 Grievant's daughter's condition and Grievant's need to not work graveyards had been known by Grievants 
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supervisor, but does not, shall be considered to have abandoned his position." Grievant 
has shown that she notified her supervisor(s). Grievant has also shown that the 
notification was "proper." She, therefore, did not "abandon" her position. 
b. Grievant has shown that the "call-off procedure is inapplicable to 
her situation. 
The "call-off procedure, located in the Utah State Hospital Operational Policy and 
Procedure Manual, Chapter: Human Resources (HR), Section 23, states, in pertinent part: 
1. Direct care employees must call at least two hours before the start of their shift, 
allowing time to find a replacement. All other employees must call before the start 
of their shift. 
2.The employee must talk directly to the supervisor or the scheduler.... 
3. In the event an absence is greater than one day, the above procedure must be 
followed each and every day unless the employee has a doctor's note, at which 
point the employee is excused for the duration stated on the doctor's note. 
Grievant has shown that, during the Step 5 hearing, the Agency's expert witness 
Robin Arnold-Williams, testified on cross-examination that the aforementioned "call-off 
procedure would not apply to Grievant's situation because her absence from work was 
not the result of illness or an emergency. [Step 5 R.49:25 through 51:9]. 
B. The "call-off" procedure is unambiguous and inapplicable to the facts 
of this case. 
The "call-off procedure and the plain language used therein are perfectly clear and 
unambiguous. Because of this clarity, it is apparent that it is inapplicable in this case. 
However, the CSRB and Agency's interpretation of the "call-off procedure "restricts the 
employee's ability to not show up for an assigned work shift to those cases involving 
illness or extreme emergencies." R. 294-295, see also Brief of Respondent, 16. Under 
supervisors since Grievant was hired and the supervisors had accommodated Grievant. 
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this interpretation, any absence from work would require a "call-off." Meaning that, in 
addition to the notification given to the supervisor when an employee wishes to take time 
off for FMLA leave, vacation, funeral, or "comp" time, that employee would also have to 
call in to his supervisor on a daily basis, to be in accordance with this interpretation of 
"call-off procedure. 
Such an interpretation would be unrealistic, redundant, would serve no 
purpose. Furthermore, this interpretation is not currently the practice of the Agency. 
Once notification is given, the purpose of the "call-off procedure has been met. 
The purpose of the two hour buffer within which direct care employees must "call-off is 
to allow "time to find a replacement." Utah State Hospital Operational Policy and 
Procedure Manual, Chapter: Human Resources, § 23. Grievant informed her supervisors 
several days in advance of her shift that she could not report for that specific shift, and 
had served notice years in advance that she could never work that type of shift regularly 
due to her daughter's handicapped state. These notices provided ample time to fulfill the 
purpose of the policy; to "find a replacement." 
It is for that purpose that the "call-off procedure, as outlined in statute, 
specifically states that it is to be used for "illness or extreme emergencies only." Utah 
State Hospital Operational Policy and Procedure Manual, Chapter: Human Resources 
(HR), Section 23. The CSRB misconstrues Grievant's position on the call-off policy. 
The Grievant did not, and will never, argue that an employee should be allowed to go 
fishing, and not "call-off or notify a supervisor of the employee's intent not to be present 
for the scheduled shift, and then be allowed to claim that because the employee was not ill 
or had an emergency, that the absence was excusable. As the CSRB stated, that would be 
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a "logical absurdity." But, if an employee had otherwise notified his supervisor that he 
would be absent, for a proper purpose such as a funeral, or in this case, to care for a 
handicapped child, the absence would clearly be excused. 
Grievant knew that she would not be able to work the assigned shift, as did her 
supervisors, and she reiterated her position at the meeting detailed earlier, which meeting 
was days prior to her scheduled shift. The "call-off procedure, that is to be used for 
unexpected "illness or extreme emergencies only" is wholly inapplicable to this situation, 
as was noted by the Agency's own expert witness.9 
Therefore, it is apparent that the CSRB erred in finding there was a factual basis 
for its finding that Grievant "abandoned" her employment. Grievant has "marshaled the 
evidence" showing that she notified her supervisors that she would not be able to work the 
assigned shift, that she never intended to resign, that the aforementioned notification was 
sufficient, and that the "call-off procedure was inapplicable to Grievant's situation. 
Furthermore, the Agency's interpretation of the "call-off procedure would be redundant 
and would serve no practical purpose, nor is the policy followed in actual practice in the 
manner suggested by the Agency.10 
CONCLUSION 
The CSRB erred in granting the Agency's motion for an extension and denying 
Grievant's default motion. The CSRB failed to employ the excusable neglect standard as 
9 Incidentally, the Agency asserts that Grievanfs counsel uses a strained interpretation of the expert's testimony. If 
the Court will review the record, the Court will see that Grievant quotes the expert verbatim. 
10 The transcript of the Step 5 hearing, with Grievant's attorney questioning Robin Arnold-Williams, the Agency's 
expert, states: Mr. Heideman: "Robin. . .in your opinion, if someone were to make a verbal statement to their 
supervisor stating that they would not be at a location, whether it be for a funeral, whether it be for any type of—any 
type of event in their life, would you consider that to be proper notification?" Mrs. Arnold-Williams: "On an 
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required by the code. This constitutes an abuse of discretion which resulted in an 
arbitrary and capricious decision. Furthermore, while the CSRB does enjoy limited 
discretion in making its decisions, the required prerequisite standard must be met. Further, 
the Agency withheld information which would have provided the CSRB with a clearer 
picture of the truth. 
The CSRB also erred in finding that there was factual support for the Department's 
decision to terminate Grievant. Grievant has provided substantial and sufficient factual 
and expert evidence to support its legal argument that Grievant did not abandon her 
employment and that she provided sufficient notice to her supervisors of her inability to 
work the new shift schedule. Finally, the "call-off procedure, is wholly inapplicable to 
the case at hand, as noted by the Agency's own expert and cannot, therefore, be the basis 
for a finding of "abandonment." Likewise, the Agency's and CSRB's interpretation of 
this policy are irrelevant and inaccurate. 
This Court should reverse the ruling of the CSRB at Step 6 on the question of 
"abandonment." This Court should find that Grievant did not "abandon" her position and 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
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that therefore, her termination was unwarranted. Grievant's employment should be 
reinstated, and Grievant should be awarded all back pay owed to her, as well as her 
attorney's fees, costs, and any other damages this Court deems just. 
Respectfully submitted this of January, 2005. 
^ 
/jUSTE^mTffilDEMAN, ~ 
ASCIONE, HEIDEMAN & MCKAY, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Grievant 
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O R I G I N A L 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant and Respondent, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency and Appellant. 
DECISION 
AND 
FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
CaseNos. 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
22 CSRB/H.0.316 (Step 5) 
On Friday, February 20, 2004, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) 
completed its appellate review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an 
executive session. The following Board members were present and heard oral argument at the 
hearing and deliberated in an executive session: Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair, Joan M. Gallegos, 
and Felix J. McGowan. Ms. Royene Aitken (Grievant) was present and represented by 
Justin D. Heideman, Attorney at Law, who presented oral argument on Grievant's behalf with 
Patrick J. Ascione, Attorney at Law, also present at the Grievant's table. Assistant Attorney General 
Debra J. Moore represented the Department of Human Services (Department and DHS) with 
David Gardner, Human Resources Director for the Utah State Hospital, present as the Department's 
management representative. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 67-19a-101-408 of the 
State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, which is a sub-part of the Utah State 
Personnel Management Act (USPMA). The CSRB's administrative rules are published in the UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE Rl 37-1-1 to -23. This Board hearing, or Step 6 appeal hearing, is the final step of 
administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures for Ms. Aitken's 
appeal of the denial of her grievance. Both the Board's evidentiary/Step 5 and these appellate/Step 6 
proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" pursuant to R137-l-18(2)(a). Therefore, those 
provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) pertaining to formal adjudications 
are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-46b et seq. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Grievant worked as a nurse on the Children's Unit of the Utah State Hospital in Provo, Utah. 
On February 19,2003, Grievant was informed that she would be transferred to the Geriatric Unit on 
the following day. On February 20? 2003, Grievant did not report to work, nor did Grievant report 
for work on subsequent days, On February 25, 2003, the Agency informed Grievant that her 
employment was terminated based on abandonment of position. 
Grievant appealed the termination to Robin Arnold-Williams, Executive Director, Utah 
Department of Human Services, who sustained the termination on March 19, 2003. Grievant then 
appealed to the CSRB. On Wednesday, August 12,2003, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before 
Hearing Officer Mark E. Kleinfield (Hearing Officer). At the hearing, Grievant was represented by 
Justin D. Heideman, Ascione, Heideman and McKay, L.L.C., Provo, Utah. The Utah Department of 
Human Services (Department or DHS) was represented by Assistant Attorney General 
Laurie L. Noda. Certified Court Reporter Kerry Sorensen, RPR, Thacker & Co., L.L.C., Salt Lake 
City, Utah, made a verbatim record of the proceedings. 
On August 29,2003, the Hearing Officer issued a written decision and order. Aitken v. Utah 
Dep *t of Human Services, 22 CSRB/H,0. 316. The Hearing Officer ruled that the Agency met its 
burden to show that Grievant abandoned her position. Applying standards for a disciplinary 
separation, the Hearing Officer considered whether the Agency demonstrated that Grievant5 s 
dismissal was <4to advance the good of the public service" or "for just cause," and ruled that the 
Agency had not met that burden. Thus, the Hearing Officer rescinded the termination of Grievant5 s 
employment with the Agency. Notwithstanding, the Hearing Officer concluded that Grievant 
knowingly violated an Agency policy, to wit, Absenteeism and Tardy Policy, Section 23, Utah State 
Hospital Operational Policy and Procedure Manual. As a penalty for the policy violation, the 
Hearing Officer ordered that Grievant be demoted one pay step, retroactively effective on 
February 25, 2003. 
The Agency appealed the Hearing Officer's Decision and Order to the Board. Grievant filed 
a Motion for Reconsideration or Interlocutory Appeal, which was denied by the Board. * The Agency 
1
 At the beginning of the Board hearing, Grievant filed a Memorandum of Supplemental Controlling 
Authorities andDocuments in Support of Grievant's Motion for Reconsideration or for Interlocutory Appeal. 
The Board finds that this memorandum constitutes a new motion and is untimely, and declines to consider 
it. The Board notes that the issue of the filing date of the Agency's brief has been previously addressed by 
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also asked the Board to dismiss Grievant5 s grievance for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that Grievant 
voluntariiyresigned from her position.2 The Board considered the Agency's appeal from the Hearing 
Officer's Decision and Order, and the Agency's Motion to Dismiss, at the hearing held Friday, 
February 20,2004. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A, STEP 5 EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND RULING 
The Step 5 hearing in the instant matter was held on August 12, 2003. The Board is 
authorized to conduct an evidentiary hearing by UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19a-406. Because the 
Agency alleged abandonment of position, the Agency bore the burden of showing abandonment by 
substantial evidence. UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19a-406(2)(a). 
The Hearing Officer framed the issues as follows: first, whether Grievant abandoned her 
position; second, if Grievant did abandon her position, is termination the appropriate remedy, or 
should a lesser penalty be imposed. The Hearing Officer found that Grievant did abandon her 
position. He then considered the employment termination on the basis of abandonment as a 
"dismissal" and applied UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18(1), which requires that a dismissal be to 
"advance the good of the public service" or for "just cause." 
Five witnesses testified on behalf of the Agency, and four witnesses, including Grievant, 
testified on behalf of Grievant. One witness was qualified as an expert in the interpretation of 
Agency policies pertaining to notification of an intended absence from work. The Hearing Officer 
heard testimony concerning whether Grievant had provided notice that she would not work her shift 
on the appointed day, following the transfer to the Geriatric Unit Further testimony addressed 
whether Grievant had "called-off," or notified the Agency that she would not report for work, on the 
the Board. The Board determined that the delay in-filing the Agency's brief was due to excusable neglect. 
The Board then imposed a filing deadline for the Agency, which the Agency met. It appears from the 
Board's file that Grievant received a fax copy of the briefing schedule, but no fax copy was sent to the 
Agency. Though it has been the Board's usual practice to electronically mail a briefing schedule to agencies 
who subscribe to the Utah state email system, there is no record that the briefing schedule was sent by email 
to the Agency. To the extent that the misunderstanding of briefing dates may be a result of Board procedure, 
the Board will ensure against recurrences by providing fax or mail notice of the briefing schedule to all 
parties, 
2
 An employee who voluntarily resigns from state employment may not file a grievance over 
termination of employment with the Board. UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19a-401(6). 
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following days. 
Following the hearing, the Hearing Officer entered his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The Hearing Officer found that Grievant did not appear at her assigned post on February 20, 
2003, or on the following two scheduled workdays, Friday, February 21, 2003, and Monday, 
February 24? 2003. The Hearing Officer also found that Grievant was aware that she was obligated 
by policy to call and notify a supervisor on each day that Grievant did not intend to report for work. 
Thus, the Hearing Officer concluded that Grievant abandoned her position. 
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The only appeal of the Step 5 Decision and Order was taken by the Agency.3 The Agency 
first asks the Board to dismiss the grievance prior to considering the merits of the issues on appeal. 
The Agency asserts that Grievant actually voluntarily resigned from her position, thus depriving 
Grievant of the opportunity to file a grievance with the Board. The Agency cites to the words spoken 
by Grievant at the time that she protested her transfer to the Geriatric Unit, as well as Grievant's 
testimony in the Step 5 hearing, to support its contention that this is actually a case of voluntary 
resignation. Grievant counters that the Agency did not treat her statements at the time of the transfer 
as evidence of an intent to resign. 
In the Agency's substantive appeal before this Board, the Agency challenges the Hearing 
Officer's analysis subsequent to his finding of abandonment of position. The Agency contests 
application of the standard of whether the employment termination is to "advance the good of the 
public service" or for "just cause." The Agency contends that standard applies only to "dismissals*5 
from public employment, and that abandonment of position leads to an employment separation that 
cannot be characterized as a "dismissal." 
The Agency further contends that the Hearing Officer erred in the substitution of a demotion 
for the employment termination. The Agency asserts that the Hearing Officer had no authority to 
modify the termination decision because this was not a dismissal. The Agency further complains 
that assuming the Hearing Officer could modify the termination decision, the Hearing Officer did 
3
 Much of Grievanf s brief on the Step 6 hearing is framed as a challenge, in the vernacular of an 
appeal, of the Hearing Officer's finding that Grievant abandoned her position. Grievant never filed a notice 
of appeal of the Step 5 Decision and Order and is thus estopped from substantively challenging the finding 
of abandonment of position. See In re Schwenke, 494 Utah Adv. Rpt. 18, 2004 WL 330254 (February 24, 
2004); Vihn Do v. Utah Dep't of Human Services, 6 CSRB 54 (1995) (declining to address due process 
claims not appealed from the Step 5 Decision and Order). 
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not give the requisite deference to the Agency's decision to terminate on the basis of abandorunent 
of position. 
C THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Board applies the appellate standard mandated by UTAH ADMIN CODE 
R137-l-22(4)(a>(c) which reads" 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual 
findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according 
to the substantial evidence standard. When the board determines that the 
factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational 
based on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in 
its discretion, correct the factual findings, and/or make new or additional 
factual findings, 
(vj \_/iice the board has either determined that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the 
factual findings based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the 
board must then determine whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly 
applied the relevant policies, rules, and statutes in accordance with the 
correctness standard, with no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB 
hearing officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the 
agency, is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings 
and correct application of relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined 
according to the above provisions. 
Based upon this standard of review, the Board first determines whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rational based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence "is that quantum 
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." Larson Limestone Co. v. State, 903 P.2d 429,430 (Utah 1995), quoting First National 
Bank v. County Bd of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990); see also Grace Drilling v. 
Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63,68 (Utah App. 1989). "It is more than a mere' scintilla' of evidence 
and something less than the weight of the evidence/' Johnson v. Board of Review of Industrial 
Comm'n, 842 P,2d 910, 911 (Utah App. 1992). 
Next, the Board reviews the fact finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer 
correctly applied "the relevant policies, rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," 
giving no deference to the Hearing Officer's legal conclusions. The Board ultimately considers 
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whether the decision of the Hearing Officer is reasonable and rational based upon the Board's 
determination of the facts, together with the correct application of relevant State policies, rules and 
statutes considered by the Hearing Officer. 
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
OF FACTS AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. WHETHER GRIEVANT VOLUNTARILY RESIGNED 
AND THE GRIEVANCE SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
The Agency urges dismissal of the grievance on the grounds that Grievant5 s actions and 
spoken words indicate an intent to voluntarily resign. The Agency relies on statements made at the 
February 19, 2003, meeting at which Grievant was told of her impending reassignment to the 
Geriatric Unit. bpeciticaUy, the Agency asserts that the following cited dialogue evidences the intent 
to resign: 
Q. In the past have you ever gone to a boss and said, "I quit"? 
A. (Grievant): No. 
Tr. 307, lines 5-7. 
Q. And when you said that you couldn't and wouldn't work that 
shift, had you ever said that before? 
A. (Grievant): No. 
Tr. 308, lines 8-12.4 
The Agency further cites to the action of Diane Maciel in escorting Grievant from the 
meeting site to her work place to retrieve some personal items, suggesting that an escort from the 
premises is consistent with a resignation. See Tr. 320, lines 20-25; Tr. 321, lines 18-21. Grievant 
counters that it was she who requested an escort from Ms. Maciel, because she was comfortable with 
Ms. MacieL Tr, 320, lines 20-25. Neither interpretation of the event is clear from the record. 
However, there was no testimony from the witnesses that Ms. Maciel accompanied Grievant to 
retrieve personal items because Ms. Maciel believed that an escort was necessary or advisable, or 
because Ms. Maciel had been instructed by hospital officials to provide the escort. In her own 
4
 Grievant asserts that these words, and related similar statements, are "relevant to determine the 
issue of abandonment, but. . . unrelated to the question of whether Grievant resigned her position." We 
disagree. Grievant has not appealed the Step 5 decision that she abandoned her position. Notwithstanding, 
as explained below, we consider the issue of abandonment in the context of whether the Agency actually 
regarded Grievant to have abandoned her position, or to have voluntarily resigned. The two possibilities are 
dependent on many of the same facts. 
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testimony, Ms. Maciel confirmed Grievant5s claim that Grievant asked Ms. Maciel to accompany 
her. Tr. 176, lines 17-21. 
The Agency cites to several cases decided by the Board. Each is distinguishable. In Bancroft 
v Utah Dep't of Commerce, J.H. 104 (1998), the grievant resigned in the face of impending 
termination after an investigation into his driver license status and suspected misuse of prescription 
medication. The grievant signed a letter of resignation was accompanied to his home to retrieve a 
state-owned automobile, and required to surrender keys and official identification cards. Further, 
the grievant sent an agent to clean out personal effects from his desk on the following day. Not only 
were the indicia of resignation unequivocal, but the parties all understood that the resignation was 
in lieu of certain disciplinary termination. 
In Donald Larsen v Utah State Prison, 1 PRB 9 (1982), the Board found that the grievant 
had tendered a verbal resignation during a telephone conversation with his supervisor. The grievant 
discussed his intention of quitting, converting accrued compensatory and annual leave to a cash 
payment, and of signing a resignation letter. The grievant did not return to work, and shortly 
thereafter obtained other employment. In Larsen, the Board found that the grievant had tendered 
his resignation on November 13, and had failed to retract his resignation on the next working day, 
November 16. On December 2, the grievant's accrued annual leave was exhausted, and prison 
officials began the three day count for abandonment of position. In the interim, the grievant spoke 
with his former supervisor about "getting his old job back," as he was not happily employed in his 
newposition. Prison officials notified the grievant that his employment was terminated and declined 
to rehire him. In ruling that the grievant had effectively resigned on November 13, the Board 
considered his inquiry to human resource staff concerning cash payment for accrued leave and 
accrued compensatory time, his removal of all of his personal items from the workplace a week 
before the November 13 telephone resignation, as well as the fact of the tendered resignation itself. 
The factors present in the Larsen decision are not before the Board in the present case. The 
evidence of a verbal resignation consists of ambiguous statements by the Grievant, and the removal 
of personal items.5 This cannot equate to the desk cleaning a week prior to an oral resignation, 
5
 Both in argument and in written memorandum, Grievant's counsel claimed that Grievant retrieved 
only some personal items, and had not turned in keys or identification badges, and that Grievant left some 
personal items at the work place. Though Grievant does not support this claim by citation to the record, we 
do not find the single element of removing personal items to be the sole, or even most persuasive, evidence 
Aitken v. Dep 't of Human Services, 8 CSRB 75 Page 7 
P - S 
benefit inquiries, and unambiguous tender of resignation bolstered by new employment in Larsen. 
In the final case cited, Betty Jo Jensen, PhD., v. Utah State Office of Education, J.H. 33 
(1988), the issue was not whether the grievant had resigned or not, but whether the resignation was 
withdrawn in a timely manner. Though the grievant claimed that the resignation was involuntary, 
the strong weight of the evidence was contrariwise. In Jensen, there was a detailed written 
resignation stating that the resignation was voluntary, and requesting two months of administrative 
leave as part of the resignation document. The administrative leave had apparently been the subject 
of discussion and negotiation for some period prior to the written resignation. This is simply not the 
case in the instant matter and the Jensen decision is of no support to the Agency. 
Though the Agency would now have the Board find that Grievant resigned, the Agency's 
conduct in the days and weeks following February 19, 2003, is illuminating. The Agency treated 
Grievant's action as an abandonment of position, not as a resignation. The Agency did not notify 
Grievant that her resignation had been accepted and was therefore effective. Rather, the Agency sent 
Grievant notice that it was exercising its prerogative under Rule 477-12*2 to terminate Grievanfs 
employment. See UTAH ADMIN. CODE R477-12-2 (1) (Supp. 2003) (abandonment of position). 
The Agency notified Grievant of her right to appeal the termination decision to the Executive 
Director of the Department of Human Services. This appeal right, articulatedinUTAH ADMIN. CODE 
R477~12-2(l)(a)> applies not to resignations, but to terminations due to abandonment of position. 
In fact, Grievant did unsuccessfully appeal her termination to the Agency Executive Director. The 
record illustrates that the Executive Director considered Grievant's circumstance an abandonment, 
and not a resignation. Tr. 35-37; 46-49.6 
Grievant's words and actions, though susceptible to alternative interpretations, did not 
of a resignation in the cases cited by the Agency. 
6
 Grievant argues that the Board should look to the Agency's present counsel's "lack of familiarity 
with the historical context of the case" as a key -and insufficient- basis for the Agency's request to dismiss 
the grievance. The Board notes that the Agency argues the notion of a voluntary resignation for the first time 
in its motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding, any party may assert a lack of jurisdiction by the Board over a 
grievance. It is axiomatic that lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime during adjudicative proceedings. 
State v. Valdez, 65 P.3d 1191 (Utah 2003); see also Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 
(Utah App. 1989) ("When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss 
the [matter] ")• 
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constitute a voluntary resignation.7 The Agency did not consider Grievant*s action a resignation and 
did not act consistent with a voluntary resignation. The Agency complied with the procedure for 
addressing an abandonment of position. We hold that Grievant did not voluntarily resign her 
employment. 
II. WHETHER THE HEARING OFFICER ERRED By ORDERING 
DEMOTION IN LIEU OF TERMINATION 
The Hearing Officer concluded that the facts of the case, measured against the applicable rule 
and Step 5 and Step 6 precedent, mandated a finding of abandonment of position. The Agency 
asserts that abandonment of position is not a "dismissal/5 and because there was no dismissal the just 
cause standard cannot apply to this case. Thus, the Agency asks the Board to sustain the termination 
of Grievanfs employment. The Agency also contests the Hearing Officer's lack of deference to the 
Agency's discretionary decision to terminate Grievanfs employment. 
Though Grievant did not appeal the Step 5 determination that she abandoned her position, 
our task is to examine whether "the factual findings of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational according to the substantial evidence standard." UTAH ADMIN. CODE R137-l-22(4)(a) 
(Supp. 2003). Accordingly, we review the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Grievant abandoned 
her position to guide our determination of whether the just cause standard of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 67-19-18(1) applies to the instant case. 
Grievant advances two arguments counter to the conclusion that she abandoned her position. 
First, Grievant asserts that the call-off policy did not apply to her circumstances. Second, as 
previously noted, Grievant requests that her words "I quit" should be coupled with her warning to 
hire an attorney, as well as her claim that she could not work under the conditions of her transfer, 
and be interpreted as notice that she would not report for work for purposes of the call-off policy, 
but not be interpreted that she would not report for work because she quit. 
The Absenteeism and Tardy Policy, § 23, Utah State Hospital Operational Policy and 
Procedure Manual, generally referred to as the "call-off" policy, requires direct patient care workers 
to give telephonic notification at least two hours before a scheduled shift if the worker could not 
7
 We note the Agency's citation to the rule that expressly bars submission of affidavits and 
additional evidence unless compelled by the Board. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R377-1-22 (2). In reaching the 
conclusion that Grievant did not resign, we rely only on the record of the Step 5 hearing. Thus, we need not 
address the Agency's request to strike Grievanfs affidavit. 
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report for the shift. The policy also requires the employee to call in each and every day of such 
absence. The two-hour buffer is necessary for the Hospital to accommodate its mission to provide 
direct patient care Order, Conclusions of Law, f 6: Tr. 196-198. 
Grievant notes the plain language of the call-off policy to state its applicability to aillness 
and extreme emergency situations only/9 Grievant parses witnesses5 hearing testimony to argue that 
the call-off policy does not apply when a worker will be absent for any reason other than an illness 
or extreme emergency. Thus, Grievant asserts that she was not obligated to notify the Hospital that 
she did not intend to report for work, since her intended absence was not due to an "illness'" or an 
"extreme emergency." 
We cannot accept Grievant's construction of the witnesses' testimony. It is not supported 
by substantial evidence and is not consistent with a fair reading of the hearing record. Grievant's 
proposed interpretation of the call-off policy leads to logical absurdity. For example, no call-off 
would be mandated if a worker learned that fish were biting on a particular body of water, and the 
worker's love of fishing prompted a day of angling when the worker was scheduled to provide 
patient care. A more sensible reading of the policy is to take it at face value. Reading the policy in 
the context of the availability of previously scheduled vacation days, as well as the critical mission 
of the Hospital, it is apparent that patient care workers are expected to report for each and every 
scheduled shift, absent a sudden illness or an extreme emergency. 
We now consider the Hearing Officer5 s conclusion that Grievant abandoned her employment 
position. The Hearing Officer found: 
Grievant was informed that she was to report to her new work assignment 
the following day, Thursday, February 20,2003, at 1800 hours (6:00 p.m.). 
Grievant did not present herself for work on February 20,2003, nor on the 
following two scheduled workdays of Friday, February 21, 2003, and 
Monday, February 24, 2003. Grievant did not call in or "call-off* within 
two hours in each instance in accordance with written hospital policy, 
Order, Findings of Fact, ffif 2 (c); 3. 
Our review of the hearing transcript finds substantial evidence to support each fact cited in 
the preceding paragraph, Chris Metcalf testified that she gave Grievant direct instructions to report 
to work at the Geriatric Unit on February 20,2003. Tr. 153-156. Francesco Lepore offered the same 
testimony. Tr, 90. Chris Metcalf testified that Grievant did not report for work on February 20, 
2003, or the two following scheduled work days. Tr. 198-201. Grievant testified that she could have 
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called to state that she did not intend to report on any of the three work days. Tr. 336-337. 
Grievant asserts that the words that she used on February 19, 2003, put her supervisors on 
notice that she would not report for work as long as she was scheduled for midnight shifts in the 
Geriatrics Unit. The Hearing Officer, who heard extensive testimony about the tone and tenor of the 
Gnevant's statements, considered and rejected Grievant3 s claim that she had given the requisite 
notice that she would not report for work. We note that Grievant has argued that those same words 
must be considered in the context of Gnevant's previous behavior, where she "had, on previous 
occasions, threatened to equif when she was frustrated, but those threats were made when she was 
upset and did not reflect an actual intent to resign." Grievant's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Agency's Motion to Dismiss Grievance for Lack of Jurisdiction at 8. See also, Tr. 266-267. 
Notwithstanding, both Diane Maciel and Chris Metcalf appeared not to take Grievant's statement 
that she would not be at work on February 20, 2003, as more than an emotional outburst. 
Tr. 164-176; 180-183. Grievant characterizes her own words not as a clear and unambiguous 
indication that she would quit, but as an emotional threat to resign. Grievant5 s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Agency's Motion to Dismiss Grievance for Lack of Jurisdiction at 8. 
The Hearing Officer sat as fact-finder; facing the witnesses and observing non-verbal 
communication, as well as the intonation and emotion of the spoken testimony. He was faced with 
weighing whether or not Grievant9 s words of February 19, 2003, gave notice of a sincere intent to 
not report for work as assigned on February 20, 2003, in light of the context and emotion of the 
meeting. The Hearing Officer heard conflicting testimony over not only the intent8 of those words, 
but the actual words spoken.9 We find that substantial evidence supports the Hearing Officer's 
determination that Grievant did not give the notice required by the Hospital's call-off policy, and 
consequently that Grievant had abandoned her position. Tr, 90,153-156; 198-201; 336-337; Order, 
Findings of Fact, ffl2(c); 3. 
8
 We note that UTAH ADMEN. CODE 477-12-2(1 )(b) states that the Agency is not required to show 
Grievant's intent to abandon her position. 
^Grievant states that she "did notify her supervisors without qualification that she would not show 
up to work the graveyard shift because of her disabled daughter's needs." Grievant does not cite to the 
record to support this argument. We note that the record is far from clear on whether Grievant discussed her 
daughter in the meeting where she stated that she would not comply with the new assignment and schedule. 
SeeTr. 80-81; 154-157; 180-182. 
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We must now determine whether the Hearing Officer properly ordered demotion of Grievant 
as a remedy for abandonment of position. The Hearing Officer noted Grievanf s stated personal 
challenges, both in working with geriatric patients and with working night shifts. The Hearing 
Officer considered the root cause of the employment termination as Grievanf s failure to notify the 
Hospital and considered that failure in light of the just cause standard. 
Career service employees may be "dismissed" only to ''advance the good of the public 
service"or for "just causes. . such as misfeasance, malfeasance or nonfeasance in office." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 67-19-18( 1) (2003). A "dismissal" is defined as "a separation from state employment 
for causer UTAH ADMIN. CODE R477-1 (43). The language of UTAH CODE ANN.§ 67-19-18, 
demonstrates that the just cause statute is intended to apply only to disciplinary dismissals and 
demotions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18(3) (2003) (director to establish procedural rules for 
"disciplinary dismissals and demotions"). 
We hold that a "dismissal/5 as used in § 67-19-18(1), is a disciplinary action, not merely a 
separation of employment. The procedures for dismissing an employee are detailed in UTAH ADMIN. 
CODE R477-1L An entirely separate rule, UTAH ADMIN. CODE R477-12, addresses three non-
disciplinary forms of employment separation, to wit, resignations> abandonment of position, and 
reduction of force. Each of these forms of employment separation are not "for cause" and thus are 
not "dismissals," Grievant was not "dismissed" from employment. Thus, the Hearing Officer erred 
in applying the just cause standard to the instant matter. 
Because we find that Grievanf s employment termination was not subject to the just cause 
standard, we hold that the Hearing Officer erred in finding an abuse of discretion by the Agency. 
Order, Conclusions of Law, <§ 7. Though the decision to terminate employment following an 
abandonment of position is indeed discretionary, the discretion firmly rests with the Agency.10 UTAH 
ADMIN. CODE R477-12-2(1). Even if the Board were to find the employment action imposed by a 
State agency to be harsh, we are limited in our power to substitute our judgment for the agency's 
decision. Career Service Review Board v. Utah Department of Corrections, 942 P,2d 933, 942 
(Utah 1997) ("CSRB is restricted to determining whether... [an agency's] sanction of dismissal is 
10
 We note that the hearing testimony was unambiguous concerning prior cases of abandonment of 
position within the Agency. The Agency has consistently exercised its prerogative to terminate employment 
in similar circumstances, Tr 48-49. 
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so disproportionate to those charges that it amounts to an abuse of discretion); Lunnen v. Utah 
Department of Transportation, 886 P.2d 70, 72-72 (Utah App. 1994). 
Though the decision to terminate employment should not be casually reached, the Board 
notes that Grievant failed to report for work involving direct patient care of institutionalized persons 
at a facility stressed by a shortage of professional nurses. This fairly fits within the long-recognized 
legal concept of nonfeasance of duty. Bell v. Josselyn, 69 Mass. 309,311; 3 Gray 3095 311 (1855) 
("Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a person ought to do... ."). Certainly, it must be said 
that a licensed health care professional ought to report for caring for ill patients, absent a legitimate 
excuse or emergency. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-19-18(1 )(b) (just cause for dismissal includes 
"nonfeasance in office"). 
DECISION 
We find that Grievant did not resign her employment. Accordingly, we deny the Agency's 
motion to dismiss, The Hearing Officer's Conclusion of Law that Grievant abandoned her position 
is sustained. Because the Grievant abandoned her position, the Agency had the discretionary option 
to terminate her employment. The just cause analysis is not applicable to a termination for 
abandonment of position. We sustain the Agency's termination of Grievant's employment. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2004. 
DECISION UNANIMOUS 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair 
Joan M. Gallegos, Member 
Felix J, McGowan, Member 
Gloria E. Wheeler, Acting Chair 
Career Service Review Board 
RECONSIDERATION 
A party may apply for reconsideration of this Step 6 formal adjudica tive decision and final agency 
action by complying with UTAH ADMIN. CODE R137-l~22(10) and UTAH CODE ANN, § 63-46b-13, Utah 
Administrative Procedures Act. 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A party may petition for judicial review of this formal adjudication and final agency action 
pursuant to UTA.H ADMIN. CODE R137-1-11, and UTAH CODE Ann. § 63«46"b-14 and -16, Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, 
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September 8, 2003 
Thacker & Co., LLC 
c/o Tiffany 
50 West Broadway, Suite 905 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2036 
Re: Royene Aitken v. Utah Department of Human Services 
22CSRB/H.CX316 
Dear Tiffany: 
This is to follow up on our telephone conversation this morning. I am confirming the 
request of the transcript from the August 12, 2003 hearing regarding the above-referenced case. 
It is my understanding that the original will be sent to the Career Service Review Board and we 
will receive a copy and the two agencies will split the cost. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
Tiffini Mass, Legal Secretary to 
DEBRAJ.MOORE 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
/tm 
cc: Claudia Jones, CSRB 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH • P O Box 140856 • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0856 
TELEPHONE ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 6 - 0 1 0 0 FAX ( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 6 - 0 1 0 1 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENEAITKEN, 
Grievant and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency and Appellant. 
SCHEDULING ORDER FOR 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL BEFORE THE BOARD 
FROM THE HEARING OFFICER'S 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND DECISION 
Case Nos. 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
22 CSRB/H.0.316 (Step 5) 
Pursuant to Career Service Review Board (CSRB) rule Rl 37-1-22(2) the following dates are hereby 
set for the parties to file their appellate briefs with the CSRB in the above-referenced matter: 
L Monday, November 10, 2003 - Agency's brief due - one copy to Respondent's Counsel, 
Justin Heideman, and an original and six copies to the CSRB. 
2. Wednesday, December 10,2003, (or 30 calendar days after receipt of Agency's brief, whichever 
is first) - Appellant's brief due - one copy to the Agency's Counsel, Debra Moore, and an original 
and six copies to the CSRB. 
These dates reflect the requirements set forth at Utah Code, R127-1 -22(2)(a) and (b). Should either 
party desire an extension of these dates, they may do so based upon good cause and written request 
to the CSRB. 
DATED this 10th day of October 2003 
Robert W. Thompson 
Administrator 
uv \i 
1120 State Office Building • Capitol Hill • Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1561 • Voice 538-3048 • Fax 538-3139 
10 03 0 3 : 2 9 P Career S e r v i c e Reviem Bd (801) 5 3 8 - 3 1 3 9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this 10th day of October 2003,1 emailed the foregoing Scheduling Order For The 
Administrative Appeal Before The Board From The Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order in the matter oiRoyene Aitken v. Utah Department of 
Human Services to: 
Debra Moore 
Assistant Attorney General 
Litigation Division 
Office of the Attorney General 
DEBRAMOOREfoiutah.gov 
and I faxed a copy of the original document to the following: 
Justin D. Heideman 
Attorney at Law 
Ascione, Heideman 8c McKay L.L.C. 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo, UT 84604-3863 
Claudia L. Jones /? 
Legal Secretary 
ADDENDUM 4 
DEBRA J. MOORE (4095) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Agency 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROYENE AITKEN, : AFFIDAVIT OF DEBRA J. MOORE IN 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
Grievant, : RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
vs. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN : 8 CSRB 75 (Step 6) 
SERVICES, Case No. 22 CSRB/H.O. 316 (Step 5) 
Agency. Hearing Officer Mark E. Kleinfield 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Debra Moore, having been duly sworn upon oath, state: 
1. I am counsel of record for the Utah Department of Human Services in the above 
captioned matter. This affidavit is based upon my personal knowledge. 
^ > l ^ .// u 
2. I have no record or recollection of having received notice of the Board's October 
10, 2003 scheduling order until November 18, 2003, when I received a fax copy of Grievanf s 
proposed default certificate, which showed a transmittal date of November 17, 2003 at 4:30 p.m. 
3. I did not participate in any telephone conference with CSRB Administrator 
Robert Thompson, with Grievanfs counsel Justin Heideman, or with anyone else concerning the 
scheduling order until November 18, 2003. On that day, after receiving Grievant's proposed 
default certificate, I telephoned the office of the Administrator to determine whether notice had 
in fact been sent, and if so, when. I was informed that according to the Certificate of Service, 
notice had been sent on October 10, 2003 by email. 
4. I then searched my computer in an attempt to find any notice from the Board 
concerning this case. I was unable to find any such notice. I also contacted Scott Morrill, 
Information Technology Manager for the Utah Attorney GeneraFs Office, and requested him to 
search my computer for any such notice. Mr. Morrill was also unable to find a notice from the 
CSRB or Claudia Jones. 
5. I then contacted the office of the Administrator again to inquire whether the email 
containing the notice had ever been opened. Mr. Thompson informed me that the email could 
not be found. 
6. Later that same day, I received a copy of a letter to Mr. Thompson from Mr. 
Heideman dated November 18, 2003, opposing my request for an extension of time in which to 
file Agency's brief. In the letter, Mr. Heideman represented that he had discussed the briefing 
2 
schedule with Laurie Noda, previous counsel for Agency, and that he had participated in a 
telephone conference with "the state" and Mr. Thompson in which the schedule was set. 
7. I forwarded a copy of Mr. Heideman's November 18 letter to Laurie Noda and 
requested her to advise me whether Mr. Heideman's representations were true. A true and 
correct copy of her response by email is attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A. 
DATED this 12th day of December, 2003. 
DEBRA J. MOOI 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12th day of December, 2003. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MARLEA FURLONG 
160 E. 300 So., 6th Fir. 
Satt Lake City, Utah 84114 
My Commission Expir** 
March 1,2006 
STATE OF UTAH 
MoJL 
NOTARY PUBLI 
/Gv/V,A-<* ^ vy 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 12th day of December, 2003,1 caused to be served by U.S. 
mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DEBRA J. 
MOORE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL, to the following: 
Justin Heideman 
Ascione and Heideman 
2696 North University Avenue, Suite 180 
Provo,Utah 84604 
ik^flpi^ 
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ADDENDUM 5 
COPY OF TRANSCRIPT 
BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
ROYENE AITKEN, 
Grievant, 
vs . 
Case No. 22 CSRB/H.O.318 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES, 
Agency. 
HEARING 
TAKEN AT: 
DATE: 
TIME: 
REPORTED BY: 
Conference Room 1112 
State Office Building 
Capitol Hill 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
August 12, 2003 
9:00 a.m. 
Kerry J . Sorensen, RPR 
T Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Salt Lake City Washington, DC New York Los Angeles 
801-983-2180 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Toll Free: 877-441-2180 Fax:801-983-2181 
www.thackerco.com 
Hearing 8/12/03 56 
THE HEARING OFFICER: For the purposes 
of this hearing we will accept the testimony of 
the witness as an expert witness in this area 
only . 
MR. HEIDEMAN: Thank you, your Honor. 
BY MR. HEIDEMAN: 
Q. Robin, after reading this document, 
would i t - - m your opinion, if someone were to make 
a verbal statement to their supervisor stating 
that they would not be at a location, whether it 
be for a funeral, whether it be for any type of--
any type of event in their life, would you 
consider that to be a proper notification? 
A, On an individual occurrence, yes. 
MR. HEIDEMAN: Okay. Let the record 
reflect, then, that the testimony of the expert is 
that speaking with a supervisor regarding the 
intent to work or not to work a particular shift 
would be considered proper notification on an 
individual basis. 
Q. Is that an accurate reflection--
A. On an individual occurrence. 
Q. Individual occurrence. Thank you. 
Individual occurrence. 
No further questions. 
:Ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader in Litigation Support 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
801-983-2180 Toll Free: 877-441-2180 Fax:801-983-2181 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
John W. FITZGERALD, Bion Tolman, Bruce B. Anderson, Emerson Kennington and K. 
Jay Holdsworth, Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY et al., Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 11157. 
Jan. 13, 1969. 
Action by property owners attacking issuance of use permit for gas station by 
board of county commissioners. The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, J., entered a judgment dismissing the complaint and the owners 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Wahlquist, District Judge, held that the findings of 
fact as promulgated by planning commission justified the denial of use permit. 
Reversed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €^770(1) 
30k770(l) Most Cited Cases 
Litigant should not be permitted to conceal his position until time of oral 
argument without showing any justification for failing to comply with procedural 
requirements respecting an appeal. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 75(p) (2). 
[2] Appeal and Error €=>770(1) 
30k770(l) Most Cited Cases 
Where respondent does not file a brief appellate court may treat such failure as 
an acknowledgment of truth of statement of facts contained in appellant's brief 
and indulge in a strong inference that law is as cited and argued by appellant's 
counsel, but court is not required to do so. 
[3] Zoning and Planning €^>373.1 
414k373.1 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 414k373) 
While board of county commissioners' discretion in granting use permit is broad, 
they do not have an absolute right to ignore their own procedural ordinances or 
act totally with unbridled discretion. 
[4] Zoning and Planning €==>435 
414k435 Most Cited Cases 
Facts as found by planning commission justified the denial of use permit for 
location of gas station and hence property owners' complaint attacking issuance of 
use permit by board of county commissioners was improperly denied. 
**653 *128 J. Randolph Ayre and K. Jay Holdsworth, of Fabian & Clendenin, Salt 
Lake City, for appellants. 
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Donald Sawaya, Deputy Salt Lake County Atty., Salt Lake City, Everett E. Dahl, 
Midvale, for respondents. 
WAHLQUIST, District Judge. 
This dispute has a rather lengthy history. It involves the construction of a gas 
station southeast of Salt Lake City. This court first became concerned with the 
dispute and considered it in Tolman v. Salt Lake *129 County. [FN1] There the 
landowners adjoining the property in question secceeded in defeating a Salt Lake 
County ordinance rezoning the area. The basis was that no legal notice was given 
of the pending hearing on the application for the rezoning. 
FNl. 20 Utah 2d 310, 437 P.2d 442. 
The instant case is concerned with a 'use permit' issued by the same Board of 
County Commissioners for the gas station. In general it can be said the statutes 
and ordinances require not only that the area be rezoned commercial before the gas 
station can be operated legally, but also that a 'use permit' be issued. The gas 
station must be authorized after certain determinations are **654 made, such as: 
necessity or desirability of the service, the effect on adjoining property, the 
effect on the master plan, and traffic flows, etc. The plaintiffs in this case 
have filed a complaint which (after some amending and use of 20 full pages) states 
almost every conceivable allegation concerning lack of due process, lack of notice 
of hearings, arbitrary and capricious action by county commissioners, etc., that 
it is possible to conceive. It not only substantially paraphrased the allegations 
contained in Tolman v. Salt Lake County (supra) but also every allegation that was 
brought in Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corporation,[FN2] and then the matter duly 
came on for hearing on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a 
cause of action. The motion was granted. 
FN2. 16 Utah 2d 192, 398 P.2d 27. 
The appellants have pursued their appeal from the trial court's dismissal of the 
complaint. They have filed a lengthy written brief. None of the respondents 
herein ever contested, by brief, the appellants' contentions. The appeal was 
continued on this court's docket for some period of time as a case in which 
appellants' brief had been filed and no respondents' brief had been filed. 
Eventually the appellants made application for oral argument. The matter was 
scheduled for argument. Appellants' counsel argued only material contained in his 
brief but gave no new contentions or new citations. 
[1] When respondents' counsel arose he was questioned by this court as to why a 
brief had not been filed. His only reply in substance was that his client did not 
really feel that the matter deserved that much attention because the zoning of the 
area was no longer commercial, that the existence of the gas station was 
indefensible. While this may be an accurate explanation as to why no action had 
been taken up to this time it is not an excuse for failing to disclose his 
position earlier. It is obvious that if the appeal process is going to operate 
within the time generally contemplated a litigant should not be permitted to 
conceal his position until the time of oral argument without showing any 
justification for *130 failing to comply with the procedural requirements.[FN3] 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
7 * " * * ^ + tT7«nf1«TT, ^s^+^/A^^r^^r U + ^ 1 0 4 ^ ^ 4 — ~ 4~ 0_ -T i _ T T T A >rT T^ 0_ J _ x - ^ i—.T^f\f\£'rc>f\f\r\f\nr\>~> r rr>s\s\r\ A I I 
Page 4 of 5 
449 P . 2 d 653 . Page 3 
22 Utah 2d 128, 449 P.2d 653 
(Cite as: 22 Utah 2d 128, 449 P.2d 653) 
FN3. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 75(p)(2), second full paragraph. 
This court immediately adjourned to conference and it was decided that inasmuch 
as the appellants were not in default or violation of any of the rules of this 
court, and had presented nothing new in their oral argument or in their brief, the 
case should be determined without hearing oral argument on behalf of the 
respondents. It may well be that the concession inferentially made by a 
respondents' counsel before this court, that the issuance of the 'use permit' 
automatically fell when the area was no longer properly zoned commercial, is 
valid. However, inasmuch as all respondents have had no opportunity to speak 
before this court and in view of the additional ruling of this court, we believe 
this matter may properly be raised in the court below. 
[2] Many appellate courts have considered the problem presented where a 
respondent does not file a brief.[FN4] As far as we are aware, this court has 
considered this matter many times but has written only one opinion on the 
question, Patton v. Evans.[FN5] While this appellate court may well treat such a 
failure to file a brief as an acknowledgment of the statement of facts contained 
in appellants' brief,[FN6] and also indulge a strong inference that the law is as 
cited and argued by appellants* counsel, the court is not always required to do 
so. In this case the court has no reason not to accept the uncontroverted 
statement of facts as set forth in appellants' brief, nor is the court **655 aware 
of any case law contrary to the position advocated in appellants' brief. 
FN4. See 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error s 1314b, and authorities therein cited. 
FN5. 92 Utah 524, 69 P.2d 969, 112 A.L.R. 589. 
FN6. The facts alleged by appellants are in general the existence of the 
ordinances requiring the Planning Commission to make certain findings of 
fact before the 'use permit' can be issued. As to their findings, see 
footnote 8. 
[3] We have examined the facts as contended by the appellants and do not find in 
them a basis for sustaining the dismissal of the complaint, even though we are 
tortured by a suspicion that something additional must have been presented to the 
trial court. The statement of law, as contained in appellants' brief, is 
consistent with our understanding, that is, that while a Board of County 
Commissioners' discretion is broad, they do not have an absolute right to ignore 
their own procedural ordinances or act totally with unbridled discretion.[FN7] 
FN7. See footnotes 1 and 2, supra. 
[4] The appellants' position is that the Planning Commission has correctly filed 
findings of fact and ruled against the issuance of a 'use permit.' They allege 
that no correct procedure has been taken to appeal from this ruling and that no 
hearing has ever been held in which different *131 findings of fact were made by 
the Board of County Commissioners. This court, therefore, accepts, for the 
purpose of this appeal, the facts as found by the Planning Commission.[FN8] We do 
not find in them any comfort for the respondents' position. 
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FN8. 'There has been no evidence presented to establish that additional 
service of this type is necessary at this location. Conversely, facts show 
that within a half-mile of this intersection, there are six service 
stations. Within a mile radius, there is a total of 16 stations and within 
a mile and one-half, there are 26 stations, total, representing nearly all 
major oil companies and three of which are vacant. The factor of need for 
additional service for the area and at this corner is difficult to establish 
in light of these facts.' 
'* * * 15,000 cars pass through this intersection per day and projections 
for the Salt Lake Area Transportation Study indicate that with the increase 
of traffic volume, it will require the widening of both 2300 East and 4500 
South from 66 feet to 100 feet * * *. Since the applicant has demonstrated 
the business volume anticipated, it must therefore follow that this heavy 
traffic generator can only hamper the free flow of traffic at this major 
intersection. 
Recently, the Granite School District purchased property immediately east of 
the intersection of 4500 South and 23 00 East for the purpose of building a 
junior high school. They project an enrollment of 1600 students. Studies 
indicate that peak service station hours occur generally at peak 
home-to-work and home-to-school hours. When a school is built, a service 
station located at this intersection would increase vehicular-pedestrian 
conflict. 
It is conceivable that the inimical affects (sic) of this commercial use on 
the abutting residential uses can be minimized, but will certainly result in 
depreciation of residental values of the immediate properties. (Emphasis 
added by the Planning Commission.) 
The greatest single adverse effect, of course, will be to reduce the 
efficiency of 2300 East Street and 4500 South Street as traffic arteries and 
will to that extent be 'detrimental to the general welfare and safety' of 
the community.' 
The Planning Commission found that Bill Roderick, Inc., had failed to comply 
with the planned unit development requirements of the ordinance. 
The Planning Commission found from the evidence that the proposed use would 
not conform to the intent of the Salt Lake County Master Plan: 
'Secondly, retail service oriented, as the proposed service station is, to 
the highways will establish precedent for commercializing the major highways 
servicing the Holladay Community and encourage 'strip commercial' 
development of 2300 East Street and 4500 South Street which is also against 
the goals and policies developed for the Master Plan. * * * there has been 
no evidence presented to establish that this requested use is in harmony 
with objectives of the Master Plan.' 
Reversed. No costs are awarded herein. 
CALLISTER, TUCKETT, HENRIOD, andELLETT, J J. , concur. 
CROCKETT, C.J., having disqualified himself, does not participate. 
22 Utah 2d 128, 449 P.2d 653 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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c 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Eulala O. HARRISON, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Gerald Lee HARRISON, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 11491. 
Dec. 3, 1969. 
Divorce case. The Second District Court, Davis County, Parley E. Norseth, J., 
entered decree awarding custody of children to defendant husband and plaintiff 
wife appealed. The Supreme Court, Ellett, J., held that custody provision would 
not be modified on basis that trial court erred in not talking privately with 
children after both counsel had invited him to do so, where plaintiff did not 
tender proof as to what children would have said. 
Affirmed. 
Henriod, and Callister, JJ., dissented. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Appeal and Error €==>770(1) 
30k770(l) Most Cited Cases 
Supreme Court will not necessarily refuse to consider an appeal simply because a 
respondent is unable or unwilling to defend his judgment and will reverse trial 
court only when he has committed an error which is prejudicial to result reached, 
and not because of default on part of successful litigant. 
[2] Witnesses €=^>40(2) 
410k40(2) Most Cited Cases 
Trial court had discretion as to whether children under ten years of age should 
be permitted to testify in court in divorce case involving their custody. 
U.C.A.1953, 78-24-1, 78-24-2. 
[3] Child Custody €^>904 
7 6Dk904 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 134k312.2) 
Provision of divorce decree awarding custody of children to father on ground that 
mother was not a fit and proper person to have custody would not be modified for 
failure of trial court to talk privately with children after both counsel had 
invited him to do so, where mother did not tender proof as to what children would 
have said. U.C.A.1953, 78-24-1, 78-24-2. 
**170 *294 Robert M. McRae, of Hatch, McRae & Richardson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff-appellant. 
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Charles E. Bradford, of Bradford & Forbes, Bountiful, for defendant-respondent. 
**171 ELLETT, Justice. 
By a divorce decree dated April 3, 1968, the defendant was awarded the custody of 
the minor children of the parties. The findings of fact, upon which the decree 
was based, specifically found that the plaintiff was not a fit and proper person 
to have the custody of the children and that the welfare of the children would 
best be served by awarding their custody to the defendant. 
*295 On December 17, 1968, a hearing was had upon plaintiff's petition to modify 
the decree of divorce and to award the minor children to her. The court dismissed 
the petition upon motion after plaintiff and her two witnesses had testified. 
This appeal followed. 
[1] Only the appellant submitted a brief in this matter; however, we do not 
necessarily refuse to consider an appeal simply because a respondent is unable or 
unwilling to defend his judgment.[FN1] We reverse the trial court only when he 
has committed error which is prejudicial to the result reached, and not because of 
a default on the part of the successful litigant. 
FN1. Jones v. Logan City Corporation, 19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P.2d 160 (1967). 
Palfreyman v. Bates & Rogers Const. Co., 108 Utah 142, 158 P.2d 132 (1945). 
The plaintiff's brief does not comply with Rule 7 5(p)(2), U.R.C.P., in that it 
does not contain a statement of points upon which appellant intends to rely for a 
reversal of the judgment or order of the court below. However, as best we can 
determine it, she thinks the trial judge erred in not talking privately with the 
children after both counsel invited him to do so. 
Our statutes set forth the qualifications of witnesses as follows: 
All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in this chapter, who, 
having organs of sense, can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known their 
perceptions to others, may be witnesses. * * *[FN2] 
FN2. Sec. 78--24--1, U.C.A.1953. 
The following persons cannot be witnesses: 
(2) Children under ten years of age, who appear incapable of receiving just 
impressions of the facts respecting which they are examined, or of relating them 
truly.[FN3] 
FN3. Sec. 78--24--2, U.C.A.1953. 
Rule 43(a), U.R.C.P., reads as follows: 
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, 
unless otherwise provided by these rules * * *. 
[2][3] Two of the children were under ten years of age at the time, and the trial 
court had a discretion as to whether they should be permitted to testify in court. 
The other two were competent witnesses and could have been called. [FN4] If the 
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court had refused to allow them to testify as he indicated, counsel could have 
made a tender *296 of their testimony, which would have preserved his record. In 
this matter the court could have talked to the children but was under no duty to 
do so. He expressed himself in no uncertain terms that he would not talk 
privately to them, and then regarding having them testify he said: 
FN4. In reply to the dissent filed herein, counsel for appellant made it 
clear to the court that he did not intend to call the children as witnesses 
in the next to the last statement he made in connection with the trial, to 
wit: 'Because--as I indicated to the Court--I rely upon the statements of 
the children, which I could do from the witness stand, but in the best 
interest of the children I believe that it would be best served by having 
the Court interview the children, and I'll rely on the testimony and the 
statements of the children for the balance of my case.' 
I don't intend to put these children on the witness stand—under oath, at their 
age--to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help them 
God, and then rely on their testimony to determine whether either or (sic) the 
parents of these children is unfit to have **172 the custody of the children; or 
whether they have been bribed, insinuated to, threatened, promised gifts, money, 
and a hundred and one other things, to induce them to go from paw to maw, or from 
maw to paw. 
I don't intend to do that, and I don't think you people ought to have even the 
remotest desire in God's world to prostitute your own children that way. 
Counsel for plaintiff never made a tender of proof, and so we are unable to say 
that it was error not to talk to the children in chambers. For all we know, each 
of the children would have spoken favorably of defendant and expressed a desire to 
remain with him. 
The order of the trial court is affirmed. Each party will bear his own costs. 
CROCKETT, C.J., and TUCKETT, J., concur. 
HENRIOD, Justice (dissenting). 
I dissent. 
The main opinion says that 'as best we can determine it she (plaintiff) thinks 
the trial judge erred in not talking privately with the children.' 
It is difficult to see how the author of the main opinion arrived at this 
conclusion, since neither the record nor the brief makes any such claim on appeal. 
In clear, printed language, plaintiff's sole point on appeal, provoked by the 
official transcript, is stated as the first sentence under 'Argument': 'It is 
reversible error for the trial court to deny to the Plaintiff the opportunity of 
producing evidence from the minor children of the parties. [FNl] The main opinion 
does not answer this point on appeal at all, but ignores it and answers what the 
author *297 thinks the plaintiff thinks is the error committed by the trial court. 
FNl. The main opinion accurately states that plaintiff did not comply with 
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Rule 75(p)(2) U.R.C.P., in that it failed to state points on appeal, if it 
refers only to a failure to note them m the 'Table of Contents'. Actually 
the point relied on was stated elsewhere as pointed out supra. Significant 
it is that the main opinion does not mention a much more serious infraction 
of the rules by the respondent, when, in his indifference to this court, it 
filed no brief at all, which is an obvious violation of Rule 75(p)(1). The 
main opinion is not based on infraction of the rules on appeal, nor did 
anyone but the author of the opinion raise the matter. Had it been 
otherwise, there is something to be said, supported by authority, to the 
effect that this case should be decided in favor of the plaintiff under the 
rules. (See Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, 121 Utah 359, 242 P.2d 297 (1952). 
Nowhere in the record or in the brief does the plaintiff claim the trial court 
erred in refusing to interview the children as the main opinion would lead us to 
believe. The error claimed is in the court's refusal to let them testify at all. 
To say that counsel's failure to make a proffer of proof as to what these children 
would or might say cures a denial of the right to call competent, qualified 
witnesses seems novel, absurd, constitutionally questionable and wholly 
unsupported by any authority cited in the main opinion. The record clearly 
discloses that the trial court was not going to pay a whit of attention to what 
these children would say in a private interview, by public statement under oath 
while on the witness stand,--and most certainly not by any words put in their 
mouths by the useless gesture of a proffer of proof. The witnesses were available 
for examination under oath. 
It would be a strange judicial system if a case could be presented to a court 
that recognized only proffers of proof as substitutes for real, live witnesses, 
with brains and memories, where they would be subject to the threat of use of the 
most potent weapon known to the judiciary for carving out the truth,--that of 
cross-examination. 
The main opinion urges that counsel for plaintiff made it clear that he did not 
intend to call the children as witnesses, and quotes an excerpt of what counsel 
said in the record, which seems to be out of context. A casual reading of the 
whole record indicates **173 that counsel said what Mr. Justice Ellett said he 
said, conditioned on the trial judge's condescension to question the children 
privately, which he never did and which he refused to do, so far as reflected by 
the record,--and which the author of the main opinion himself conceded the trial 
court refused to do, by saying that the trial judge 'expressed himself in no 
uncertain terms that he would not talk privately to them.* Counsel's statements 
thereafter indicate that failing such private interview, he would be allowed to 
examine the children in open court. To determine otherwise from this record is to 
cast counsel for plaintiff in the role of stranger to the truth, when he said in 
his brief, presumably in good faith, that: 
'Here, the Judge, without any attempt to determine the competency of the minor 
children to testify, refused to permit the plaintiff to introduce such evidence, 
either in the manner agreed to and stipulated by the parties, to wit, in a 
private hearing with the Judge, or to permit them to be called as witnesses.' 
*298 Of course, we do not have the benefit or courtesy of a respondent's appeal 
brief to support the contentions of the main opinion. See footnote 1, supra. 
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The cold facts of this case and the legitimate basis for an appeal are that the 
trial judge refused to listen to the children (ages 14, 10, 8 and 2), under any 
circumstances whatever,[FN2] made no effort to canvass their capacity to testify, 
in spite of the provisions of Title 78--24--1 and 2,[FN3] and completely ignored 
Rule 43(a), U.R.C.P.[FN4] 
FN2. Private interview with children in divorce cases generally are 
condoned. See 99 A.L.R.2d 954; Austad v. Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 P.2d 
284, 48 A.L.R.2d 256 (1954). Kreutzer v. Kreutzer, 226 Or. 158, 359 P.2d 
536 (1961); 'So far as appears, the children were competent witnesses. * * 
* Consequently, the right of the defendant to call the children to the stand 
and to elicit testimony from them material to the issues was precisely the 
same as it would have been in the case of any other competent witness. 
This, of course, is a fundamental right. (Citations) In divorce cases, it 
seems to be uniformly held that the court has no authority to exclude the 
testimony of children of the parties of tender years if they are otherwise 
competent witnesses. (Citations) There is no reason for a different rule in 
a proceeding for modification of a provision in a divorce decree granting 
the custody of children, for the parties to such a controversy have the same 
right to present evidence in open court as in any other case.' 
FN3. 78--24--1. 'Who may be witnesses * * * All persons, without 
exception, otherwise than as specified in this chapter, who, having organs 
of sense, can perceive, and, perceiving, can make known their perceptions to 
others, may be witnesses.' 
78--24--2. 'Who may not be witnesses: * * * (2) Children under ten years of 
age, who appear incapable of receiving just impressions of the facts 
respecting which they are examined, or of relating them truly.' 
FN4. 'Form and Admissibility. In all trials the testimony of witnesses 
shall be taken orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by these 
rules. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the 
statutes of this state or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in 
the courts of this state.1 
The main opinion, in support of its conclusion, says the court had a discretion 
as to whether the two youngest (8 and 2) would be allowed to testify. True, 
especially as to the 2-year old,--but not with respect to the 8-year old, unless 
tested with respect to capabilities under 78--24--2, supra. Certainly such 
discretion did not apply to the children 10 years or older without questioning 
them as to their powers of perception and capabilities to make such perceptions 
known to others. 
In support of the opinion, the author quotes a homely and somewhat unorthodox 
trial judge's refusal to permit a witness to testify. A casual reading of the 
quotation taken from the trial court reflects not only a refusal to permit 
erstwhile competent witnesses to testify, but an unwarranted refusal to follow the 
clear interdictions of the legislation and rule mentioned supra. 
This case should be remanded for further proceedings consonant with what is said 
hereinabove. (Emphasis supplied). 
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**174 CALLISTER, Justice (dissenting). 
I concur with the dissenting opinion of Justice Henriod. However, I believe that 
*299 the motion filed by respondent, wherein he moved this court to decide the 
instant matter solely upon the brief of the plaintiff-appellant, is a significant 
factor in the proper disposition of this case. This motion, in light of the 
debatable character of the issue before this court, is tantamount to a confession 
of error. 
'* * * Generally, where there are debatable issues and the appellee fails to file 
an answering brief, such failure is a confession of reversible error on the part 
of the appellee. * * *'[FN1] 
FN1. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 Ariz.App. 352, 427 P.2d 156, 158 (1967); also 
see Del Castillo v. Harbour, 8 Ariz.App. 233, 445 P.2d 181, 183 (1968). 
This case should be reversed and remanded to the trial court for a new hearing. 
23 Utah 2d 294, 462 P.2d 170 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Michael W. HOM, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, a governmental agency; Cherie Ertel; 
Douglas Bodrero; A. Roland Squire; Arthur Hudachko; Bart Blackstock; and 
John Does I through X, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 970592-CA. 
July 16, 1998. 
Former employee of Department of Public Safety brought action against Department 
and individuals, alleging breach of employment contract and disability 
discrimination. The District Court, Henriod, J., granted defendants' summary 
judgment motion, and former employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., 
held that: (1) former employee failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and 
thus, Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over Personnel Management Act claim, 
and (2) discovery rule did not apply to toll four-year limitations period 
applicable to Rehabilitation Act claim. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Officers and Public Employees €=>72.41(2) 
283k72.41(2) Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals could consider for first time on appeal whether former employee 
of Department of Public Safety failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under 
Personnel Management Act, which would deprive Court of subject matter jurisdiction 
over action. U.C.A.1953, 67-19-1 et seq. 
[2] Appeal and Error €=^782 
30k782 Most Cited Cases 
When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction the court retains only the 
authority to dismiss the action. 
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure €^229 
15Ak229 Most Cited Cases 
Parties protesting agency actions must generally exhaust all available 
administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. 
[4] Officers and Public Employees €=>72,41(2) 
283k72.41(2) Most Cited Cases 
Wrongful termination claim brought by former employee of Department of Public 
Safety was action in vindication of rights created by Personnel Management Act, 
and thus, Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act required employee to pursue 
grievance through administrative appeal, where employee failed to argue that 
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Department entered in to any contract with him that altered or added to terms and 
conditions of public employment included in Personnel Management Act and 
implementing regulations. U.C.A. 1953, 67-19a-401(4)(a). 
[5] Officers and Public Employees €^>72.41(2) 
283k72.41(2) Most Cited Cases 
Former employee of Department of Public Safety, who brought action seeking 
vindication of Personnel Management Act rights, failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies, and thus, Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction over Act 
claim, where employee allowed his Career Service Review Board appeal to be 
dismissed for failure to prosecute. U.C.A. 1953, 67-19a-401(4)(a). 
[6] Civil Rights €==>1379 
78kl379 Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 78k210) 
Utah's four-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions 
generally applies to Rehabilitation Act claims. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 2 
et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. 
[7] Appeal and Error €^>842(1) 
30k842(l) Most Cited Cases 
[7] Limitation of Actions €^>199(1) 
241kl99(l) Most Cited Cases 
Issue of whether the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations is 
a question of law, and thus, the Court of Appeals needs to show no deference to 
the trial court's ruling on appeal, but reviews the ruling for correctness. 
[8] Limitation of Actions €=^95(1) 
241k95(l) Most Cited Cases 
"Discovery rule" tolls the running of a statute of limitations in some instances 
when a plaintiff was not in a position to know of the existence of the cause of 
action before the end of the limitations period. 
[9] Limitation of Actions €^>95(1) 
241k95(l) Most Cited Cases 
[9] Limitation of Actions €^>104(1) 
241kl04(l) Most Cited Cases 
"Discovery rule" tolls a statute of limitations in the following three 
exceptional situations: (1) when the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) 
when a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the 
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) when the case presents 
exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be 
irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has prevented 
the discovery of the cause of action. 
[10] Limitation of Actions €^>104(1) 
241kl04(l) Most Cited Cases 
Discovery rule did not apply to toll four-year limitations period applicable to 
former employee's Rehabilitation Act claim, based upon employer's alleged 
concealment of existence of claim, where evidence indicated employee's termination 
was based on his job performance, rather than on any perceived mental disability, 
and employee failed to allege that coemployees took affirmative steps to conceal 
claim. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. 
[11] Limitation of Actions €=>104(1) 
241kl04(l) Most Cited Cases 
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Under the concealment prong of the discovery rule for tolling the running of a 
statute of limitations, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that 
defendants actively concealed the existence of a cause of action and that, given 
defendants' actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the claim 
earlier. 
[12] Limitation of Actions €=^95(15) 
241k95(15) Most Cited Cases 
Discovery rule did not apply to toll four-year limitations period applicable to 
former employee's Rehabilitation Act claim, based upon exceptional circumstances, 
where employee knew all facts supporting his claims within limitations period and 
these facts were sufficient to put employee on notice that his superiors believed 
he was unstable. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. 
[13] Limitation of Actions €=>95(1) 
241k95(l) Most Cited Cases 
To meet the exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule for tolling the 
running of a statute of limitations, a plaintiff must show that he did not know of 
and could not reasonably have known of the existence of the cause of action in 
time to file a claim within the limitations period; once the plaintiff has made 
this showing, the court must apply a balancing test to determine whether a case 
presents exceptional circumstances that render the application of a statute of 
limitations irrational or unjust. 
[14] Limitation of Actions €^>95(1) 
241k95(l) Most Cited Cases 
Simple ignorance of or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will 
not prevent the running of a statute of limitations. 
*97 L. Zane Gill, Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Jan Graham and Debra J. Moore, Salt Lake City, for Appellees. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME, JJ. 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Michael Horn appeals the trial court order granting summary judgment in favor of 
the Utah Department of Public Safety (the Department) and individual defendants in 
Horn's suit for breach of employment contract, breach of implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing, and disability discrimination. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Because this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we recite the facts 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Glover v. Boy Scouts of 
Am., 923 P.2d 1383, 1384 (Utah 1996). Horn presents the following account of the 
events leading up to and surrounding his termination from the Department. 
Horn was hired in 1985 as a programmer/analyst. Although Horn was employed by the 
Department and had access to sensitive law enforcement information, he was a 
career civil servant and not a sworn police officer. His primary 
responsibilities were to provide technical assistance and to remain on call to 
deal with computer problems for the Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI) and the 
Driver License Division. From 1985 through 1987, Horn performed satisfactorily 
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and received positive evaluations on his job performance. However, Horn concedes 
that during this period his supervisor advised him in job evaluations that he 
should try to improve his "political and people skills." 
In 1987, Horn was appointed the technical subcommittee chairperson for a "Request 
for Proposal Committee" (RPC) formed by the Department to select a vendor for a 
new computer system. Horn's RPC duties were in addition to his regular work. 
Horn lost sleep, frequently worked twenty-hour days, *98 and felt stress and 
pressure because of overwork. As the RCP selection process progressed, Horn 
became convinced that his fellow committee members were acting illegally to favor 
certain vendors. Horn confronted the other RPC members about this perceived 
illegal conduct. As a result of these confrontations, several coworkers lodged 
complaints against Horn, and he was banned from the Driver License Division offices. 
During the RPC dispute, Horn also became involved in a dispute with his direct 
supervisor about overtime hours. Horn filed a grievance on this issue and won an 
award of additional overtime. Horn used the overtime to take a leave of absence, 
and he was away from the Department from November 1988 to May 1989. 
In July 1989, Horn was assigned to supervise the Driver License Division annual 
job run, a major annual event in which Department personnel purged the Driver 
License Division computer files. Horn encountered problems during the job run, 
and these problems led to a second internal affairs investigation. As a result 
of the job run incident, Horn's immediate supervisor issued a letter of intent to 
reprimand and met with Horn to explain the reasons for the reprimand. The 
supervisor was concerned with Horn's refusal to obey the supervisor's direct 
orders, and Horn's inability to provide a satisfactory explanation for the job run 
failure. Horn's supervisor was also concerned because Horn had ignored explicit 
instructions during the job run. The supervisor informed Horn that he could 
discuss disagreements and alternatives with supervisors, but in the future Horn 
would be expected to carry out supervisors' instructions even if he disagreed with 
them. Horn objected to this requirement. Horn then made a statement about having 
the power to crash and disable the Department computer system. Horn asserts that 
he intended this statement as a claim that he would not follow an order that would 
crash the system. However, Horn's supervisor interpreted it as a threat that Horn 
would crash the system. 
After this meeting, Horn was placed on temporary leave. On his return, Horn met 
with the BCI chief to discuss the internal affairs investigation and Horn's own 
plans to file a grievance over the job run incident. Horn alleges that the 
Department head attempted to dissuade him from prosecuting his grievance and 
"warned him to work things out with" his supervisor. At this meeting, Horn made 
another statement about his power to damage the computer system. While Horn 
remembers this comment as a response to a theoretical question, the BCI chief 
remembers it as "coming out of the blue" and sounding like a threat. Shortly 
after making this comment, Horn broke down and began crying uncontrollably. The 
BCI chief later stated that he felt Horn was "on a downward spiral" and had become 
emotionally unstable. However, Horn states the BCI chief never recommended that 
he seek counseling. 
During the subsequent internal affairs investigation, Horn's superiors concluded 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
L++~.//~ ««'«.+ ±1 /J-
Page 6 of 11 
962 P.2d 95 Page 5 
962 P.2d 95, 347 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 
(Cite as: 962 P.2d 95) 
that he was responsible for the job run failure, had acted insubordinately, and 
had perjured himself. Horn was dismissed from the Department in March 1990. The 
Department gave the following reasons for the dismissal: 1) Horn was perceived to 
be a security threat, 2) Horn had committed perjury, 3) Horn had committed 
malfeasances and misfeasance, and 4) Horn had been insubordinate. 
Horn appealed his termination administratively under the Utah State Personnel 
Management Act (Personnel Management Act), but his administrative appeal was 
ultimately dismissed for lack of prosecution. In 1994, Horn filed suit against 
the Department, claiming that his dismissal violated the Personnel Management Act 
and Department of Human Resources (DHR) regulations implementing that Act. In 
1995, Horn amended his complaint to add a disability discrimination claim under the 
Federal Vocational Rehabilitation and Other Rehabilitation Services Act of 1978 
(the Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 to 796 (Supp.1998). The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Department, dismissing both claims. Horn 
now appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
Horn presents two arguments on appeal. First, he argues the trial court erred in 
*99 barring his wrongful termination claim under the three-year statute of 
limitations for violations of rights created by statute. He asserts that his 
suit was an action for breach of contract subject to the six-year statute of 
limitations for claims arising out of contracts in writing under Utah Code Ann. § 
78-12-23(2) (1996) . Second, Horn argues the trial court erred in refusing to toll 
the statute of limitations on his disability discrimination claim under the 
discovery rule. "Because summary judgment presents only a question of law, we 
review the trial court's determinations under a standard of correctness, according 
no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions." Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. 
Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct.App.1997). 
I. Did Horn Fail to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies? 
[1][2] As a threshold issue, we first address the Department's argument that we 
lack jurisdiction over this case because Horn has failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies under the Personnel Management Act. Horn argues that we 
cannot consider this issue because the Department did not raise it before the 
trial court. We disagree. If Horn has failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies, then we lack subject matter jurisdiction, and we must dismiss the case 
"[r]egardless of who raises the issue." Maverik Country Stores, Inc. v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct.App.1993); see also Hi-Country 
Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989) (holding 
court had no subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to timely appeal 
an agency order); Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991) (addressing defense of failure to exhaust remedies though raised for 
first time at oral argument on appeal). "When a matter is outside the court's 
jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, 
Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
[3] Under Utah law, parties protesting agency actions must generally exhaust all 
available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. "The basic 
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purpose underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 'is to 
allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its special 
competence--to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its 
own error so as to moot judicial controversies.1 " Maverik Country Stores, 860 
P.2d at 947 (quoting Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818, 31 
L.Ed.2d 17 (1972)); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Utah Indus. Comm'n, 
904 P.2d 236 (Utah Ct.App.1995). 
[4][5] In this case, the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
67-19a-101 to -408 (1996), provided a clearly available administrative remedy. 
The Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act provides a formal review process for 
career service employee dismissals. See Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401 (1996). 
Furthermore, the Act explicitly prohibits judicial review of a career service 
employee's grievance when the employee has failed to pursue the grievance in a 
timely manner: 
(4)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect 
established by rule, if the employee fails to process the grievance to the next 
step within the time limits established in this part, he has waived his right to 
process the grievance or to obtain judicial review of the grievance. 
Id. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (1996) (emphasis added). 
Horn failed to complete the administrative appeal process. Horn initially 
appealed his dismissal to the Career Services Review Board (the Board) under the 
Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act. However, Horn failed to actively pursue his 
administrative appeal. Thus the Board dismissed Horn's appeal in 1993 for failure 
to prosecute. 
Horn attempts to dodge his jurisdictional problem by casting his claim as a civil 
action for breach of contract, rather than an action to vindicate rights created 
by the Personnel Management Act. Horn argues that the Personnel Management Act and 
its implementing regulations created a contract of employment in writing that was 
sufficient to give rise to a civil suit for breach of contract. *100 Horn relies 
on several Utah cases to argue by analogy that the Personnel Management Act and 
implementing regulations create separate contractual rights for state employees. 
These cases fall into two groups. The first group includes cases holding that 
public employees have a contractual right to accrued retirement benefits. See 
Ellis v. State Retirement Bd., 757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah Ct.App.1988), aff'd, 783 
P. 2d 540 (Utah 1989); Newcomb v. Ogden City Pub. Sch. Teachers' Retirement Comm'n, 
121 Utah 503, 508-10, 243 P.2d 941, 944 (1952). The second group includes cases 
holding that personnel policy manuals or other agreements between state agencies 
and their employees can create contractual rights in addition to the public 
employees' underlying statutory rights. See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 
P.2d 165, 169 (Utah 1992) (Thurston T ); Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State 
College, 636 P.2d 1063, 1065-67 (Utah 1981). Both groups of cases are clearly 
distinguishable from Horn's case. 
Horn relies first on Utah cases holding that public employees have a contractual 
right to vested retirement benefits that cannot be abrogated by new state 
legislation. Under Utah law, public pension and retirement systems give rise to 
vested contractual rights. See, e.g., Ellis, 7 57 P.2d at 88 5-86; Driggs v. Utah 
Teacher's Retirement Bd., 105 Utah 417, 421-23, 142 P.2d 657, 659-60 (1943). Horn 
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argues that his right to continued employment under the Personnel Management Act 
is comparable to a state employee's right to vested retirement benefits. 
Utah and other jurisdictions have consistently treated vested retirement and 
disability benefits as an exception to the general rule that civil servants' 
employment rights are statutory rather than contractual. See, e.g., Miller v. 
California, 18 Cal.3d 808, 135 Cal.Rptr. 386, 557 P.2d 970, 973 (1977); Gili v. 
Oregon State Univ., 49 Or.App. 379, 619 P.2d 938, 939-40 (1980); Personnel 
Division v. St. Clair, 10 Or.App. 106, 498 P.2d 809, 811 (1972). We acknowledged 
this distinction in Ellis, 7 57 P.2d at 886, where we stated that a public employee 
obtains vested rights to retirement benefits "only when he has satisfied all 
conditions precedent to receiving his benefit, i.e., he has attained retirement 
age, or has been medically disabled." 
The crux of Ellis and other public retirement benefits cases was whether benefits 
earned by retired employees under a previous legislative scheme could be 
diminished or abrogated by new legislation. Horn's case is not comparable to 
these cases because it is a straightforward dispute about whether the Department 
met the requirements of the Personnel Management Act when it dismissed Horn for 
cause. Thus we conclude that our past treatment of vested retirement benefits 
has no bearing on our characterization of Horn's claim of wrongful termination 
under the Personnel Management Act. 
In addition to the retirement benefits cases, Horn cites several Utah cases where 
agency personnel manuals and similar documents were held to create contractual 
employment rights separate from the underlying statutory rights of public 
employees. See Thurston I, 835 P. 2d at 168; Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 
P.2d 1034, 1037-39 (Utah 1995) (Thurston II ); Piacitelli, 636 P.2d at 1065-67. 
Horn claims these cases show that the Personnel Management Act and implementing 
regulations constitute a written employment contract between Horn and the 
Department. We disagree. 
In Piacitelli, the Utah Supreme Court addressed a claim by a counselor at a state 
college that his termination violated his due process rights as set forth in the 
college's personnel manual. See Piacitelli, 636 P.2d at 1064. However, the 
employee in Piacitelli was explicitly exempt from the Personnel Management Act, 
and the court found that the college's personnel manual had created a separate 
employment contract in place of the statutory scheme. See id. at 1066. Under 
these facts, the court found that Piacitelli's employment relationship with the 
college was governed by the college's personnel manual and was therefore 
contractual rather than statutory. See id. Thus, Piacitelli involved an exempt 
employee with a written contract separate from the Personnel Management Act, and 
it has no bearing on Horn's claim that the Personnel Management Act and 
implementing regulations constitute an actionable employment contract. 
*101 In Thurston I and Thurston II, a county employee sued for wrongful 
termination, casting his suit as an action for breach of an employment contract 
created by the county personnel manual. See Thurston I, 835 P. 2d at 167. The 
Utah Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that the action was properly a 
statutory claim under the Personnel Management Act. See id. at 170. On remand 
the county argued that it was exempt from the Personnel Management Act because it 
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had fewer than 130 employees. However, the court below refused to overrule the 
supreme court under the law of the case doctrine. See Thurston II, 892 P.2d at 
1037. We conclude that Thurston I and Thurston II do not establish, as Horn 
claims, that public employees' wrongful termination actions should be treated as 
suits for breach of contract. 
Other jurisdictions faced with similar claims have uniformly rejected the 
proposition that a public employment act and implementing regulations, without 
more, create a contractual right to continued public employment. See, e.g., 
Thorin v. Bloomfield Hills Bd. of Educ., 203 Mich.App. 692, 513 N.W.2d 230, 237 
(Mich.Ct.App.1990) (Corrigan, P.J., concurring) (stating recognition of 
contractual claims "in the public sector would have significant adverse policy 
ramifications ... [and] lead to the denial of the right of the people, through 
their elected representatives, to decide crucial political questions"); Smith v. 
City of Newark, 128 N.J.Super. 417, 320 A.2d 212, 218 (1974), rev'd on other 
grounds, 136 N.J.Super. 107, 344 A.2d 782 (1975) (stating "it is well settled that 
'the terms and conditions of public service in office or employment rest in 
legislative policy rather than contractual obligations, and hence may be changed' 
" (citation omitted)). 
Horn has not argued that the Department entered into any contract with him that 
altered or added to the terms and conditions of public employment included in the 
Personnel Management Act and implementing regulations. We conclude that Horn's 
wrongful termination claim is an action in vindication of rights created by the 
Personnel Management Act. Consequently, the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act 
required Horn to pursue his grievance through an administrative appeal. By 
allowing his Career Service Review Board appeal to be dismissed for failure to 
prosecute, Horn "waived his right to ... obtain judicial review" of his dismissal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (1996). Horn has therefore failed to exhaust 
his administrative remedies, and we have no jurisdiction to adjudicate his 
statutory claim. 
II. Did the Court Err in Dismissing Horn's Federal Disability Discrimination Claim? 
[6][7] Horn also filed a disability discrimination claim against the Department 
based on the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 to -796 (Supp.1998). The 
statute of limitations for claims under the Rehabilitation Act is the four-year 
statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions generally. See 
Baker v. Board of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 631-32 (10th Cir.1993) (holding statute 
of limitations for Rehabilitation Act claims is state limit applicable to personal 
injury claims). Thus the trial court concluded this claim was barred by the 
statute of limitations and dismissed it. Horn concedes that the four year statute 
of limitations applies to this cause of action. However, he argues that the 
trial court erred in dismissing his claim because the running of the statute of 
limitations was tolled in his case by operation of the discovery rule. "Because 
the issue of whether the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations 
is a question of law, we need show no deference to the trial court's ruling on 
appeal, but we review it for correctness." Klinger v. Rightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870 
(Utah 1990). 
[8][9] The discovery rule tolls the running of a statute of limitations in some 
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instances where a plaintiff was not in a position to know of the existence of the 
cause of action before the end of the limitation period. See Sevy v. Security-
Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 961-63 (Utah Ct.App.1993), vacated in part, 902 P.2d 629 
(Utah 1995). Utah courts will apply the discovery rule in three exceptional 
situations: 
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in 
situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because 
of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; *102 and (3) in situations 
where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the 
general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the 
defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 578 (Utah Ct.App.), cert. 
denied, 929 P.2d 350 (Utah 1996) . 
Horn urges us to apply the discovery rule in this case because 1) other Department 
employees concealed from him the fact that his mental instability was one reason 
for his termination, and 2) exceptional circumstances exist in this case that 
prevented him from discovering the existence of a cause of action under the 
Rehabilitation Act. 
A. Concealment 
[10][11] Under the concealment prong of the discovery rule, a plaintiff must 
establish a prima facie case that defendants actively concealed the existence of a 
cause of action and that, given defendants' actions, "a reasonable plaintiff would 
not have discovered the claim earlier." Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 51 
(Utah 1996) . Horn alleges the following facts to establish a prima facie case of 
concealment. First, his termination notice did not include mental disability in 
the list of reasons for his firing. Second, in interrogatories during the early 
stages of litigation, the defendants did not state that they thought Horn was 
mentally or emotionally disabled. Third, in depositions later in the litigation, 
several employees, including Horn's direct supervisor, stated that they began to 
worry about his mental stability toward the end of his employment because he acted 
irrational, angry, and "kooky." 
These facts are insufficient to establish that defendants took affirmative steps 
to conceal the existence of a cause of action. First, the evidence indicates 
that Horn's termination was based on his inability to perform his job or interact 
acceptably with coworkers, not on any perceived mental disability. Second, Horn has 
not alleged that any Department employees took affirmative steps to conceal a 
cause of action. At most, the facts as Horn recounts them suggest that some 
Department employees thought Horn should seek counseling but did not explicitly 
tell him so. These facts do not add up to an allegation that Horn's coworkers 
"took affirmative steps" that would have prevented a reasonable person from 
discovering this alleged cause of action. See Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. We find 
this case similar to Anderson, where we stated that "the facts underlying the 
allegation of fraudulent concealment are so tenuous, vague, or insufficiently 
established that they fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to 
concealment." Anderson, 920 P.2d at 580 n. 4. Thus we conclude Horn has not 
established a prima facie case of concealment. 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
h++*>.//r>T^+ TTrAnfln.T, ~ ^ * ~ IA ~1 ^
 T ~ ~ r U+^IOJ ± A - 0_-C ^.—T TTHX XT T^ O 1 . * 1—1-» ^ ^  f- f ^ ^  / ^ ^ ^  ^  
Page 11 of 11 
962 P.2d 95 Page 10 
962 P.2d 95, 347 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 
(Cite as: 962 P.2d 95) 
B. Exceptional Circumstances 
[12][13][14] Horn also argues that his case presents exceptional circumstances 
that justify application of the discovery rule. To meet the exceptional 
circumstances prong of the discovery rule, a plaintiff must make two showings. 
First, he must show that he "did not know of and could not reasonably have known 
of the existence of the cause of action in time to file a claim within the 
limitation period." Sevy, 857 P.2d at 962. Once a plaintiff has made this 
threshold showing, the court must then apply a balancing test to determine 
"whether a case presents exceptional circumstances that render the application of 
a statute of limitations irrational or unjust." Id. at 963. "Simple ignorance of 
or obliviousness to the existence of a cause of action will not prevent the 
running of the statute of limitations." Anderson, 920 P.2d at 578. "All that is 
required to trigger the statute of limitations is ... sufficient information to 
... put [plaintiffs] on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or 
questions." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51. 
Horn presents no evidence to support his claim that he did not know or could not 
reasonably have known of this cause of action. On the contrary, Horn knew all the 
facts supporting his claims within the statutory period. Horn knew that he was 
under severe stress. Horn was aware of his deteriorating relations with 
coworkers. Horn knew of the complaints filed against him and of other employees' 
statements that they feared he was dangerous. He also knew that he had been 
banned from the Driver License *103 Division, and that his superiors had consulted 
the FBI because they thought he posed a serious security risk. These facts were 
more than sufficient to put Horn on notice that his superiors believed he was 
unstable. Even assuming such instability would qualify as an actionable 
disability, we conclude that the events leading up to and surrounding Horn's 
dismissal should have put Horn on notice that the Department might have terminated 
him because of a perceived mental or emotional disorder. Thus we hold the 
discovery rule does not apply, and Horn's disability discrimination claim is barred 
by the statute of limitations. 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that Horn failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Utah 
State Personnel Management Act. Thus we dismiss Horn's wrongful termination claim 
for lack of jurisdiction. We also conclude that the discovery rule did not toll 
the running of the statute of limitations on Horn's disability discrimination 
claim. Thus we hold that Horn's disability discrimination claim is barred by the 
statute of limitations. 
BENCH and ORME, JJ., concur. 
962 P.2d 95, 347 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 
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James M. LUNNEN, P e t i t i o n e r , 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, and the Career Service Review Board of the 
State of Utah, Respondents. 
No. 930737-CA. 
Nov. 21, 1994. 
Certiorari Denied March 13, 199 5. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) employee petitioned for review of Career 
Service Review Board's (CSRB's) affirmance of DOT'S disciplinary action against 
him. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that DOT presented sufficient 
evidence to meet burden of proving that sanction was not disproportionate. 
Affirmance of disciplinary sanction upheld. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Administrative Law and Procedure €>=>800 
15Ak800 Most Cited Cases 
Absent statutory grant of discretion, state agency's interpretation of statute 
presents question of law, which Court of Appeals reviews for correctness. 
[2] Administrative Law and Procedure €>=>797 
15Ak797 Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals reviews agency's application of its own rules for reasonableness 
and rationality, according agency some, but not total deference. 
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure €^758 
15Ak758 Most Cited Cases 
[3] Administrative Law and Procedure C^>788 
15Ak788 Most Cited Cases 
[3] Officers and Public Employees €^>72.31 
283k72.31 Most Cited Cases 
Career Service Review Board's (CSRB's) authority to review departmental 
disciplinary actions is limited to determining if there is factual support for 
charges, and if so, whether sanction is so disproportionate to charges that it 
amounts to abuse of discretion. 
[4] Administrative Law and Procedure C^758 
15Ak7 58 Most Cited Cases 
[4] Administrative Law and Procedure €^788 
15Ak788 Most Cited Cases 
[4] Officers and Public Employees €=>72,53 
283k72.53 Most Cited Cases 
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[4] Officers and Public Employees €^72.55(1) 
283k72.55(l) Most Cited Cases 
Court of Appeals had to determine if Career Service Review Board (CSRB) 
appropriately reviewed disciplinary sanction of demotion imposed on Department of 
Transportation (DOT) employee by considering whether DOT presented factual support 
for its allegations and whether sanction was so disproportionate that it amounted 
to abuse of discretion, on review of CSRB's affirmance of DOT'S disciplinary 
action. 
[5] Officers and Public Employees €>^>72.63 
283k72.63 Most Cited Cases 
Evidence of Department of Transportation (DOT) employee's failure to respond to 
emergency call-out clearly supported DOT'S assertion of misconduct. 
[6] Officers and Public Employees €=>72.61 
283k72.61 Most Cited Cases 
Department of Transportation (DOT) had to persuade Career Service Review Board 
(CSRB) that sanction imposed on DOT employee was not disproportionate, on DOT 
employee's appeal of demotion for failing to respond to emergency call-out. 
[7] Officers and Public Employees €=>72.31 
283k72.31 Most Cited Cases 
Consistency of discipline may be part of Career Service Review Board's (CSRB's) 
analysis of whether sanction imposed by state agency was disproportionate. 
[8] Officers and Public Employees €^72.61 
283k72.61 Most Cited Cases 
Agency has initial burden before Career Service Review Board (CSRB) to show that 
discipline imposed on agency employee was not disproportionate to misconduct. 
[9] Officers and Public Employees €^>72,61 
283k72.61 Most Cited Cases 
Once agency fulfills initial burden, in connection with review of disciplinary 
action by Career Service Review Board (CSRB), of showing that discipline was not 
disproportionate to misconduct, it is incumbent on employee to raise any due 
process concerns, including consistency, so that due process issues can be dealt 
with properly. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[10] Administrative Law and Procedure €^513 
15Ak513 Most Cited Cases 
[10] Officers and Public Employees €^>72.28 
283k72.28 Most Cited Cases 
Notice. 
Agency, as well as employee, is entitled to notice of issues to be raised before 
Career Service Review Board (CSRB) in connection with review of disciplinary 
action. 
[11] Officers and Public Employees €^72.61 
283k72.61 Most Cited Cases 
Once agency fulfills its initial burden of providing factual basis for its 
allegations and its burden of demonstrating that its sanction is not 
disproportionate, employee must raise due process concerns and/or rebut agency's 
evidence. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[12] Officers and Public Employees €^>72.53 
283k72.53 Most Cited Cases 
If employee fails to raise due process concerns and/or rebut agency's evidence, 
after agency fulfills its initial burden of providing factual basis for its 
allegations and its burden of demonstrating that sanction is not disproportionate, 
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there is no basis on which to find that agency's sanction amounts to abuse of 
discretion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[13] Administrative Law and Procedure €^513 
15Ak513 Most Cited Cases 
[13] Officers and Public Employees €^72.29 
283k72.29 Most Cited Cases 
Agency employee failed to raise consistency as issue at evidentiary hearing, and 
thus Career Service Review Board (CSRB) was correct in not requiring Department of 
Transportation (DOT) to affirmatively present additional evidence that sanction 
was consistent with similar misconduct cases. 
[14] Officers and Public Employees €^72.63 
283k72.63 Most Cited Cases 
Career Service Review Board's (CSRB's) ruling that Department of Transportation 
(DOT) presented sufficient evidence to support two-grade demotion of employee did 
not fall beyond bounds of reasonableness and rationality, where employee failed to 
respond to 20% of call-outs, and DOT district manager testified that another 
employee who repeatedly disregarded instructions to respond to emergency call-outs 
suffered two-grade demotion. 
*71 Phillip W. Dyer, Salt Lake City, for petitioner. 
Stephen G. Schwendiman and Jan Graham, Salt Lake City, for respondents. 
Before BENCH, DAVIS and GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
James M. Lunnen (Lunnen), petitions for review of the Career Service Review 
Board's (CSRB) affirmance of the Utah Department of Transportation's (UDOT) 
disciplinary action against him. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
Lunnen has been employed by UDOT since 1978. In 1989, UDOT promoted Lunnen to a 
Grade 19 Highway Operations Specialist. Highway Operations Specialists are 
subject to being on twenty-four-hour emergency "call-out." Such emergencies 
include snow removal, guard rail repair, and other types of highway maintenance. 
On April 2, 1992, Paul Crossland, Lunnen's supervisor at UDOT, informed Lunnen 
that he would be disciplined if he did not improve his response to call-outs. On 
June 12, 1992, Lunnen received a call from a UDOT dispatcher instructing him to 
report immediately to 700 West and 1-215 in Salt Lake County. Lunnen, however, 
failed to report to the location. Consequently, on August 15, 1992, UDOT demoted 
Lunnen to a Grade 17 Highway Operations Specialist with a corresponding 2.75% 
reduction in pay. 
Lunnen appealed his demotion to CSRB. CSRB appointed a hearing officer who, on 
November 10, 1992, held an evidentiary hearing on Lunnen's appeal. Gene 
Sturzenegger, a UDOT district manager, testified at the hearing that UDOT imposed 
similar disciplinary action against another employee who had failed to respond to 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
UMr*'//v\*-i*\4- ,x,^o+1«^r ~ ^ * ~ / , 1 ~ 1 ~ L w l O J . - i ^- o -C-
Page 5 of8 
886 P.2d 70 Page 4 
886 P.2d 70 
(Cite as: 886 P.2d 70) 
call-outs. Others also testified regarding Lunnen's failure to respond to the 
call-out and his subsequent demotion. Lunnen testified that he believed the 
call-out to be a prank and therefore did not respond. Lunnen did not assert at 
any time during the hearing that the disciplinary action taken against him was 
inconsistent *72 with UDOT actions against other employees for similar infractions. 
On January 5, 1993, the hearing officer issued an Interim Order stating that 
Lunnen was subject to discipline because he had been insubordinate by not 
responding to the June 12 call-out. The hearing officer held Lunnen's demotion 
and pay reduction in abeyance until UDOT submitted further proof that the 
disciplinary action taken against Lunnen was consistent with similar 
insubordination incidents. The hearing officer ordered that the record remain 
open pending UDOT's compliance with the order to provide additional information. 
Lunnen subsequently filed with the hearing officer a Request for Reconsideration, 
objecting to introduction of further evidence by UDOT and requesting that the 
hearing officer dismiss UDOT's case because it failed to meet its burden of proof. 
The hearing officer received UDOT's additional evidence, and, on March 15, 1993, 
upheld the disciplinary sanction against Lunnen and denied Lunnen's Request for 
Reconsideration. 
On October 27, 1993, CSRB affirmed the hearing officer's Order that upheld UDOT's 
disciplinary action. However, CSRB found that the hearing officer's requirement 
that UDOT produce additional evidence of consistency was unnecessary, reasoning 
that the testimony of Gene Sturzenegger was sufficient evidence regarding 
consistency and proportionality of the sanction. This petition for review 
followed. 
ISSUES 
Lunnen presents three issues in his petition for review. First, did CSRB err in 
placing the burden of proof on Lunnen to demonstrate that the sanction was 
inconsistent? Second, did CSRB err in determining that UDOT presented sufficient 
evidence of consistent application? Third, did the hearing officer err in 
leaving the record open to allow additional evidence on the issue of the 
appropriate sanction? [FN1] 
FN1. Because we find that Lunnen was required to at least raise the issue 
of inconsistency at the evidentiary hearing, but failed to do so, and 
because we further find that Lunnen failed to rebut UDOT's evidence of 
proportionality and consistency, we do not reach Lunnen's second and third 
arguments. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1][2] Absent a statutory grant of discretion, a state agency's interpretation of 
a statute presents a question of law, which this court reviews for correctness. 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 1991). However, we 
review an agency's application of its own rules for reasonableness and 
rationality, according the agency some, but not total deference. Kent v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 860 P. 2d 984, 986 (Utah App.1993) (stating that 
review of CSRB's affirmance of state employee's termination required application 
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of facts to departmental rules and thus requires reasonableness and rationality 
test). 
ANALYSIS 
Burden Of Proof 
Lunnen asserts that CSRB erred in shifting to him the burden of proving UDOT's 
inconsistency of discipline and abuse of discretion. [FN2] 
FN2. In its Decision and Final Agency Action, dated October 27, 1993, CSRB 
states that: 
UDOT had the initial burden to show that its discipline was supported by 
just cause. Once the agency has shown that its disciplinary sanction was 
reasonable and correct in relation to the facts and circumstances, then the 
burden is on the employee to show that the penalty imposed was 
disproportionate or otherwise constituted an abuse of discretion. 
[3][4] To begin our analysis, we first examine the role CSRB plays in the review 
process. CSRB's authority to review departmental disciplinary actions is limited 
to determining if there is factual support for the charges and, if so, whether the 
sanction is so disproportionate to the charges that it "amounts to an abuse of 
discretion." Utah Dep't of Corrections v. Despain, 824 P.2d 439, 443 (Utah 
App.1991). In Despain, the Utah Department of Corrections dismissed a prison 
guard for off-duty conduct including drunk driving and domestic disputes. The 
Department's Administrative Law Judge *73 found that there was a factual basis to 
support the Department's allegations. The guard then appealed to CSRB which 
overturned the Department's termination, finding that the guard had not been 
terminated for just cause. Id. at 441. This court reversed CSRB's determination 
because the Department's allegations were supported by the facts and because we 
were unable to say that the discipline was clearly disproportionate. Id. at 448. 
See also Pickett v. Department of Commerce, 858 P.2d 187 (Utah App.1993). 
Therefore, we must determine if CSRB appropriately reviewed Lunnen's disciplinary 
sanction by considering if UDOT presented factual support for its allegations and 
if the sanction was so disproportionate that it amounted to an abuse of discretion. 
[5] Lunnen does not dispute that UDOT produced sufficient evidence of his 
misconduct. Indeed, evidence of Lunnen's failure to respond to an emergency 
call-out clearly supports UDOT's assertion of misconduct. Lunnen does, however, 
dispute that CSRB had sufficient evidence to determine whether the disciplinary 
sanction was disproportionate. Lunnen, as part of his disproportionality 
argument, states that UDOT had the burden of proving that the sanction was 
consistent with other insubordination actions. As support for this argument, 
Lunnen cites Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-406(2)(a) (Supp.1993), which states that 
"[t]he agency has the burden of proof in all grievances resulting from dismissals, 
[and] demotions." Further, Lunnen points to Rule 477-11-1.(1) of the Rules of 
the Department of Human Resource Management which states that the type and 
severity of any disciplinary action taken shall be governed by principles of due 
process which include: (a) Consistent application, (b) prior knowledge of rules 
and standards, (c) determination of facts, (d) timely notice of noncompliance, and 
(e) opportunity to respond and rebut. R477-11-1.(1) Utah Admin.Code (1993) 
(emphasis added). Lunnen argues that when taken together, Section 67-19a-406 and 
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Rule 477-11-1.(1) place on UDOT the burden of proving that the discipline was 
consistent with other discipline for similar misconduct. Thus, Lunnen asserts 
that CSRB erred in placing the burden of proof on him instead of UDOT. 
[6][7] We agree with Lunnen that UDOT must persuade CSRB that the sanction 
imposed was not disproportionate. Moreover, we believe that consistency of 
discipline may be a part of CSRB's disproportionality analysis. Lunnen, however, 
would have us take one step further and require UDOT to affirmatively prove 
consistency of discipline as outlined in Rule 477-11-1. (1). However, consistency 
of discipline is only one of several due process requirements listed in the rule. 
If we were to adopt Lunnen's argument, we would also have to require UDOT to 
affirmatively prove all aspects of due process enumerated in Rule 477-11-1.(1), 
including the employee's prior knowledge of rules and standards, determination of 
facts, timely notice of noncompliance, and opportunity to respond and rebut. Id. 
[8][9][10] Such a requirement, that the agency affirmatively prove all aspects of 
due process, regardless of whether the employee has raised a due process concern 
at the evidentiary hearing, is both impractical and unduly onerous. The agency 
has the initial burden to show that the discipline was not disproportionate to the 
misconduct. Once the agency fulfills that initial burden, it is incumbent on the 
employee to raise any due process concerns, including consistency, so that due 
process issues can be dealt with properly. The agency, as well as the employee, is 
entitled to notice of the issues to be raised. This requirement ensures that the 
employee's due process rights are protected while at the same time provides a fair 
and reasonable process for all concerned. 
[11][12] Therefore, we hold that once the agency fulfills its initial burden of 
providing a factual basis for its allegations and its burden of demonstrating that 
its sanction is not disproportionate, the employee must then raise due process 
concerns and/or rebut the agency's evidence. If the employee fails to do so, 
there is no basis on which to find that the agency's sanction "amounts to an abuse 
of discretion." Despain, 824 P.2d at 443. 
[13] Since Lunnen failed to raise consistency as an issue at the evidentiary 
hearing, CSRB was correct in not requiring UDOT to *74 affirmatively present 
additional evidence that Lunnen's sanction was consistent with similar misconduct 
cases. 
Sufficient Evidence 
[14] We must next determine if UDOT presented sufficient evidence to meet its 
burden of proving that the sanction was not disproportionate to the misconduct. 
In its Decision and Final Agency Action, CSRB found that "[t]he record evidence, 
based upon the facts and circumstances of Mr. Lunnen's case, establishes just 
cause for his demotion." CSRB found that UDOT had produced sufficient evidence 
regarding the severity of the insubordination, stating that Lunnen's "response 
rate [to call-outs] from January through June 21 was an unacceptable twenty 
percent." Moreover, CSRB found that the "Department's penalty was based upon the 
totality of Mr. Lunnen's insubordination behavior ... not just for his failure on 
June 12." 
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CSRB also found that UDOT had produced sufficient evidence regarding the 
proportionality of the sanction. CSRB accepted the testimony of Gene 
Sturzenegger, a UDOT district manager, who testified about an incident that 
occurred two years prior to the hearing when another employee repeatedly 
disregarded instructions to respond to emergency call-outs. Sturzenegger 
testified that on one occasion the employee had been called at home, answered the 
dispatcher's call, yet deliberately failed to respond. The employee's 
insubordination resulted in a two-grade demotion coupled with a ten or eleven 
percent pay decrease. Thus, CSRB stated that "there is sufficient credible 
substantial evidence in Director Sturzenegger's unrebutted testimony regarding the 
Tooele employee's insubordinate actions to support UDOT's demotion of Mr. Lunnen." 
Lunnen failed to rebut any of UDOT's evidence regarding severity of the 
misconduct or proportionality of the sanction at the evidentiary hearing. 
Therefore, we cannot say that CSRB's ruling that UDOT presented sufficient 
evidence to support its sanction against Lunnen fell beyond the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the agency ultimately must convince the hearing officer and CSRB that 
the disciplinary sanction is not disproportionate, the employee must at least 
raise concerns about consistency or other due process concerns so that CSRB may 
appropriately deal with those issues. In this case, Lunnen failed to raise the 
issue at the evidentiary hearing and further failed to rebut evidence provided by 
UDOT that the sanction was not disproportionate. We therefore uphold CSRB's 
affirmance of UDOT's disciplinary sanction against Lunnen. 
BENCH and DAVIS, JJ., concur. 
886 P.2d 70 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Briefs and Other Related Documents 
This case was not selected for publication in the Federal Reporter. 
Please use FIND to look at the applicable circuit court rule before citing this 
opinion. Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3. (FIND CTA10 Rule 36.3.) 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
Miguel M. RIOS and Corina Rios, husband and wife, and as parents and next 
friends of Ami and Roxanne Rios, minor children, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ex rel United States; United States 
Department of Immigration and Naturalization Service; United States Border 
Patrol, Defendants-Appellees. 
Jose L. Arrieta, Movant-Appellant. 
No. 02-2032. 
Dec. 13, 2002. 
Civil rights action was brought. Following entry of order removing plaintiffs' 
attorney, and entry of final order, plaintiff's attorney moved for extension of 
time to file appeal with respect to his removal. The United States District Court 
for the District of New Mexico denied motion. Attorney appealed. The Court of 
Appeals, Lucero, Circuit Judge, held that magistrate judge abused her discretion 
in basing her decision on her conclusion that appellate jurisdiction was lacking, 
and failing to render determination on issues of excusable neglect and good cause. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
United States Magistrates C=?31 
394k31 Most Cited Cases 
Magistrate judge abused her discretion in denying motion for extension of time 
for appeal, when she based decision on her conclusion that appellate jurisdiction 
was lacking, which was matter reserved to Court of Appeals, and failed to render 
determination on issues of excusable neglect and good cause. F.R.A.P.Rules 3(a)(2) 
, 4(a)(5), 28 U.S.C.A. 
*41 G. Greg Valdez, Las Cruces, NM, for Plaintiffs. 
Cynthia L. Weisman, Office of the United States Attorney, Albuquerque, NM, for 
Defendants-Appellees. 
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Manuel I. Arrieta, The Arrieta Law Firm, Las Cruces, NM, for Movant-Appe1lant. 
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*] 
FN* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The 
court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; 
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and 
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
LUCERO, Circuit Judge. 
**1 Jose L. Arrieta appeals from the magistrate judge's denial of his motion for 
an extension of time to file an appeal. [FNl] Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and § 1291, [FN2] we conclude that the magistrate judge 
failed to apply the appropriate legal standard and accordingly reverse. 
FNl. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 
determined unanimously to grant the parties' request for a decision on the 
briefs without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 
FN2. The parties in the underlying case consented to proceed before the 
magistrate judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Jenkins v. City of Topeka, 
136 F.3d 1274, 1275 n. 1 (10th Cir.1998). 
Attorney Arrieta was disbarred in the state of New Mexico and subsequently 
placed on supervisory probation for one year, during which time he was prohibited 
from practicing law as a sole practitioner. Nonetheless, during this probationary 
period, Arrieta entered his appearance as counsel for plaintiffs in the underlying 
civil rights suit. He then applied for admission to the district court bar. 
Rejecting the application, the clerk advised Arrieta that he could apply for 
admission only after his probationary period with the state bar ended. In 
response to Arrieta*s subsequent challenge to that decision, the clerk informed 
him that the district court judges unanimously voted to uphold Arietta's 
suspension until the probationary period ended. 
Consequently, in an order dated March 14, 2001 (March Order), the magistrate 
judge presiding over the underlying civil rights suit removed Arrieta from the 
case. This order made findings regarding not only Arrieta's representation in the 
underlying case, but also his involvement in other *42 pending federal district 
court cases. In addition, the magistrate judge directed that a copy of the March 
Order be sent to the state disciplinary board. 
Arrieta sought an interlocutory appeal from the March Order in this Court. 
Expressing doubts regarding appellate jurisdiction, we requested that the parties 
file supplemental briefs in June of 2001. In his supplemental brief, Arrieta 
cited Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 
Copr. © 2004 West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
L4.4~.// :-* 
Page 4 of 5 
53 Fed.Appx. 40 Page 3 
53 Fed.Appx. 40, 2002 WL 31781144 (10th Cir.(N.M.)) 
(Cite as: 53 Fed.Appx. 40, 2002 WL 31781144 (10th Cir.(N.M.))) 
L.Ed. 1528 (1949), to argue that his appeal fell within the collateral order 
doctrine. We dismissed the appeal on November 13, 2001, concluding that Arrieta 
had to wait until the district court issued a final order before he could appeal 
the March Order. Arrieta claims that he received a copy of this dismissal order 
on November 20, 2001. 
While the interlocutory appeal was pending, the magistrate judge issued a final 
order in the underlying case on September 18, 2001. Arrieta failed to file his 
notice of appeal within sixty days of this date as required under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B). [FN3] On November 30, 2001, ten days after he 
allegedly received notice of the dismissal of his interlocutory appeal, Arietta 
filed a motion for an extension of time on the basis of excusable neglect pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). The magistrate judge's denial of 
this motion constitutes the subject of the present appeal. 
FN3. Counsel erroneously states that the time for taking an appeal was 
thirty days under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A). Because 
the United States was a party to the underlying action, however, Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(B) applies and Arrieta had sixty days to 
file, even though the government was not a party to the appeal. In re 
O'Bryan, 399 F.2d 916, 918 (10th Cir.1968) ("The test as to the application 
of the 60 day period is not whether the United States might be concerned or 
interested in the final judgment, but whether it is a party to the action in 
which the judgment was entered."); see also Lonberg v. Sanborn Theaters 
Inc., 259 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir.2001) ( "It is of no moment that the 
United States is not a party to the appeal in question."). 
We review the district court's determination of a Rule 4(a)(5) motion for abuse 
of discretion. Romero v. Peterson, 930 F.2d 1502, 1505 (10th Cir.1991). Failure 
to apply the correct legal standard in ruling on a motion constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir.1997) ("A clear 
example of an abuse of discretion exists where the trial court fails to consider 
the applicable legal standard...."). 
**2 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) provides that the district court 
may extend the time for taking an appeal if the party seeking to appeal (1) moves 
for an extension no later than thirty days after the time for taking an appeal has 
expired, and (2) demonstrates either excusable neglect or good cause for failing 
to appeal in a timely manner. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(5); City of Chanute v. 
Williams Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1045 (10th Cir.1994). Despite the clear 
language of this provision, however, the magistrate judge did not render a 
determination on the issues of excusable neglect or good cause. During the 
hearing, Arrieta presented the chronology of events set out above to argue that 
his failure to file a timely appeal was excusable. In the oral ruling, the 
magistrate judge's only response to this argument suggests that in fact, she was 
inclined to find that excusable neglect existed. (Appellant's App. at 32 ("I'll 
tell you, I mean, he makes a good point with regard to--as far as neglect in 
making a timely appeal.").) Nevertheless, focusing on the relationship between the 
appeal and the underlying suit, the magistrate judge denied the motion, finding 
that "[t]he jurisdictional *43 basis that really served as the premise for 
[Arietta's] case no longer exists." Id. at 37. Thus, the decision was based not 
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on the absence of excusable neglect {for which we intend no opinion on the 
merits), but rather on the magistrate judge's conclusion that appellate 
jurisdiction was lacking, a matter reserved to the appellate court to determine. 
Fed. R.App. P. 3(a)(2) ("An appellant's failure to take any step other than the 
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, 
but is ground only for the court of appeals to act as it considers appropriate, 
including dismissing the appeal."). 
Because the magistrate judge failed to apply the excusable neglect standard, her 
ruling constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the denial of Arrieta's 
motion for an extension of time is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED for a 
proper determination of excusable neglect under the applicable standard. The 
mandate shall issue forthwith. 
53 Fed.Appx. 10, 2002 WL 31 781144 (10th Cir. (N.M.)) 
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